

PERMANENT
VALUES IN
EDUCATION

KENNETH RICHMOND

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THE PERMANENT VALUES
IN EDUCATION

The truly great
Have all one age, and from one visible space
Shed influence ! They both in power and act
Are permanent, and Time is not with them
Save as it worketh for them, they in it.

COLERIDGE.

THE
PERMANENT VALUES
IN EDUCATION

BY
KENNETH RICHMOND

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
A. CLUTTON-BROCK

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THE
FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
OF EDUCATION

BY
J. H. H. H. H. H.

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THE
FUNDAMENTAL VALUES
OF EDUCATION

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PREFACE

THESE brief studies are offered as *hors d'œuvres* for the neglected feast of educational history. We are perhaps in sight of the time, long overdue, when teachers will have full opportunity and incentive to learn the elements of their art before they are called to its practice ; and when that time has come a book of this kind will be superseded, as it ought to be superseded, by the mere minimum of recollection that every teacher will carry in his own mind from the historical side of his training in pedagogy. Meanwhile, many teachers have never opened a book that tells any part of the inspiring story. It is literally inspiration, not only instruction, of which they deprive themselves. It might seem a harsh exaction to demand that the schoolmaster and mistress, when classes are over, paper work corrected and to-morrow's lessons prepared (if they prefer, with Thring, to give children to drink from a running stream, not from a stagnant pool), should give their hour of leisure to an arid absorption in the history of ideals ancient and outworn. But the old ideals are not outworn ; the

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trouble with them, as Mr. Chesterton has said of the Christian ideal, is not that they have been tried and found wanting, but that they have been found difficult, and left untried. Their inspiration lies in the hope that they may yet be tried, and tried effectually.

The teacher who turns for rest and refreshment at the day's tired close to the original sources of this inspiration—the wide universalism of Comenius, the devoted humanitarianism of Pestalozzi, or the practical idealism of Froebel—will not be disappointed. It is good to feel the companionship of other and greater teachers of the past in one's struggles with the present; and such companionship is of a kind that gives hope and courage for the future in these days when education has everything to offer in furtherance of our task of reconstruction. This little book does not aspire to point the way of educational reconstruction, but only to suggest that there are springs yet unexhausted from which living water can be drawn by the educators of to-day.

At the same time personal conclusions, personal attempts at a revaluation of old ideals in terms of new conditions, are put forward here in all their probable crudity. It is of no use to absorb even yesterday's thoughts without recasting them in to-day's mould; and ideals that have lain in

a state of half-suspended animation for centuries need to be still more carefully reinterpreted by all who study them. My own reinterpretations must be regarded as sacrifices upon the altar of this principle. If they are immature and inconclusive, they are here to be improved upon.

It is only fair to add that they are also, in the main, subsequent additions to a series of articles which have appeared in *The Times Educational Supplement*, and reappear in this extended form by the courtesy of *The Times*. Anything inept in my work should be regarded as having been written outside the scrutiny of the Supplement's editor, to whom I am indebted not only for good editing and the judicious help which a few editors have the ability and the will to give, but also for the suggestion that originally prompted an undertaking full of interest at least for myself.

The debt which my concluding chapter owes to Mr. Clutton-Brock's book, *The Ultimate Belief*, will be apparent, most of all to those who have had the good fortune to read that book; and Mr. Clutton-Brock has added to my obligation by consenting to write the introduction that follows.

INTRODUCTION

THE first thing, perhaps, that will strike the reader of this book is the fact that nearly all the great educators, whether teachers themselves or only theorists, have been rebels against the ordinary education of their time. It seemed to them so absurd a waste and perversion of human faculties that most of them could not refrain from bad language about it. Mr. Richmond quotes the saying of Montaigne : " We toil only to stuff the memory and leave the conscience and understanding void." Bacon speaks of cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit. Milton says that we " hale and drag our choicest and hopefullest wits to that asinine feast of sow-thistles and brambles which is commonly set before them as all the food and entertainment of their tenderest and most docible age." Pestalozzi says that, after reading *Emile*, the home as well as the public education of the whole world, and of all ranks of society, appeared to him as a crippled thing. So actual education always has appeared to the great educators ; and

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one might suppose from a hasty reading of Mr. Richmond's chapters that the history of education, at least, tells us only of follies and crimes. And yet the great educators themselves, and their fame, prove that mankind have always had an immense desire for a better education and an unfailing hope of it. Indeed there is nothing that they are so constantly sanguine about, nothing that seems to them so bright in the future and therefore so dull in the present and past. We all desire better things for our children than we have known in our own childhood. Here are the children with the future of the world in their hands ; are they to grow dull, as we have grown dull, by being robbed of curiosity and desire in the very process that ought to fill them with these things ? All through the ages, no doubt, parents have looked at the bright faces of their children and have sworn to themselves that that brightness shall not be dimmed by the schoolmaster. And yet there is something in these very parents which makes them consent, generation after generation, to this same dimming process ; and the schoolmaster protests that, where he fails, it is because he obeys the parent's will. But for the parents, he says, he could make education what it ought to be.

There is clearly some malign force in parents or in schoolmasters, or in both, which constantly

perverts all their desires and efforts, which makes the schoolmaster a byword to the parent and the parent a byword to the schoolmaster ; but what is it ? We may search through Mr. Richmond's work for this force as well as for those permanent values which it seems so constantly to obscure ; and I think we shall find it, as persistent as those values themselves.

The great educators always tell us that we must appeal to the child's own sense of absolute values ; for that sense is in the child, and it is the same in all children, though it may vary in strength. It is the common faith of all great educators that absolute values are always of the same nature in all human beings. That faith is the reason why they are educators, why education seems to them the most interesting thing in the world. Mr. Richmond, for instance, quotes the saying of Locke that children " have as much a mind to shew that they are free ; that their good actions come from themselves . . . as any of the proudest of you grown men." The aim of education, for Locke and for all the great educators, is to give the child that freedom of the spirit which can only come with obedience to the sense of absolute values, to his, the child's own sense and not to his teacher's. The child must know that his good actions come from himself, if they are to be to him good actions. But,

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though the parent and the schoolmaster may desire this freedom for the child, there is something in both which makes them fear this freedom ; and both teach the child himself to be afraid of it. What is the cause of this fear ?

It is not merely the vulgar will to power over the child, but something far subtler and more unconscious. It is their constant tendency to associate education with status, to regard it as a means, not to freedom of the spirit but to some kind of superiority. The education of the Jew, for instance, was based upon the belief that the Jews were the chosen people of God and superior in righteousness to all other peoples. It was an education which inevitably led to self-righteousness, as we see in the case of the Pharisee who thanked God that he was not as other men. Then Mr. Richmond summarizes Xenophon's account of the education of the Persians : " Keep youth fit, and active, and honourable, and nothing else is of great account." That was the education of a conquering race. It taught the boy to take a pride in those qualities which marked him as a member of that race. It appealed to the sense of honour ; and honour is always associated with status. It is the form which the moral sense takes in those who feel themselves to be members of a superior class. This Persian education, as Mr. Richmond says, was in its aims

very like the education of our own public schools. It was fine so far as it went ; but it did not go far enough, and it must very easily have declined into an encouragement of certain kinds of stupidity. If a Persian had the sense of honour and obeyed it we may guess there was no need for him to think much, least of all to criticize the results of his sense of honour in action. It must be right because it was the morality of his own superior class ; and if it were not right then his class would not be superior.

So status always robs those who are keenly aware of it of their critical faculty ; their egotism is enlisted on the side of their education, and they prize their education with the blindness of self-love. Greek education, except the education of the Spartans, must have been much freer from the sense of status than Persian ; and yet it too was the education of a superior people constantly aware of their intellectual and æsthetic superiority. Aristotle's ideal man is what we should call a superior person, and his whole system of behaviour is based upon his sense of his own superiority. In his own way, a more intelligent way, he is a Pharisee, and one can see that he might easily become a pedant. So the whole education of the Roman Empire, an education based in the main upon Greek principles, became more and more pedantic. What is it that leaves us a little cold in the *Meditations*

of Marcus Aurelius? It is the fact that this lofty Stoic morality of his is inspired by the sense of its own loftiness. It is purified of all the more vulgar kinds of status. The Emperor is not proud of being an Emperor, or a Roman, or an Aristocrat ; but he is proud of being a Stoic. As a Stoic he must be kind and forbearing to all men ; but only because he is a Stoic and has a wisdom which they do not possess. Lucian in that Dialogue of his in which he puts all the philosophers up to auction treats the Stoic with more respect than most of them. But he makes the Auctioneer proclaim that the Stoic is the only just and wise man ; and the Stoic in his satire is, as we should say, a little Bethellite. That is his weak point, which Lucian, the universal sceptic, ridicules ; and through this weak point he fell easily into pedantry.

Christianity made a direct attack upon all sense of status, yet it could not free the education of the Roman empire of Pedantry ; and even St. Augustine thought that the style of the Gospels was bad. A Christian might condemn all culture as Pagan ; he did not make the deadlier attack upon the culture of his time that it was no longer culture because it was pedantic. He did not see that Christianity, if all its principles were acted upon, meant a new life to culture itself, a new sense of adventure and beauty which must produce great art and literature and

philosophy. And we have not seen this even to the present day. We still appeal to one sense of status or another in our education, and in that appeal we are constantly falling into one kind of pedantry or another.

Why, for instance, is it that the well-to-do have so long submitted to the manner in which Greek and Latin are taught in most of our public schools? They complain but they do not rebel; and the reason clearly is that they believe Greek and Latin, as they are taught, to be part of the education of a gentleman. A public school boy may not learn to read either language, with ease or pleasure, after five years of teaching; but he does learn not to make a false quantity, and we are all agreed that a false quantity is the mark of a socially inferior education. Those who do not make false quantities belong to one class, and those who do make them belong to another. It is a test more exclusive than the dropping of an "H." But if our education were emptied of the sense of status we should not be content with this avoidance of false quantities as the result of five years of teaching; and we should see that it is an absurd pedantry to be proud of it. Education, in fact, is not a thing to be proud of at all. One of the first aims of education should be to remove all pride in it. The better a man is educated, morally, intellectually, and æsthetically, the less

proud he is of what he knows ; for the result of his education is to give him a thirst for knowledge and for doing all things rightly, in which he forgets to pride himself on what he knows or on what he does rightly ; forgets himself and his own achievements altogether. He, himself, exists only in a certain relation with the universe outside him ; he opens out to all that is good or true or beautiful as a plant opens out to the sun ; and the proper aim of education is to make men open out thus, forgetting themselves and their own status in the warmth and light of their fellowship with the universe outside them.

But education cannot achieve this aim, or even possess it, if it appeals to any sense of status in the pupil. Mr. Richmond speaks of the wider ideal of Comenius, which was also shared by Pestalozzi, the ideal of education "as the service of humanity, not merely as the culture of a superior caste, which sufficed for the educational idealism of Milton and Locke." Pestalozzi wished all children to be educated, not merely that they might "do their duty in that state of life to which it should please God to call them," but so that they might be fully developed human beings. The child was to him a child and not a member of some particular class ; and so it has been with all the great modern educators who have followed him. They have been freed from pedantry because they have been freed from the

sense of status. The Kindergarten, said Froebel, is the free republic of childhood. It would be impossible to base Froebel's principles upon any sense of status whatever. He believed in the free activity of the child's mind and in an incessant appeal to that activity. Education for him was a means of achieving freedom, a freedom from that conflict in the mind which is itself slavery, because it is impotence. But he further believed that this freedom ought to be attained to by all human beings ; and it can only be so attained to if all human beings wish to attain to it in common. As soon as it is regarded as a privilege of some one class, superior either in birth, in riches or in culture, it cannot be attained to at all, for the very sense of superiority is itself a slavery. The individual who belongs to the superior class and whose morality is based on his sense of superiority, is the slave of his class. He submits to its ideas so that he may feel superior, and not to the voice of his own conscience. It is the faith of all great educators that conscience in all men is the same, so far as it really is conscience and the inner voice. But when it is an outer voice, then it is subject to the differences of class or nationality. It is something which does not speak in a man's own mind, something rather which is spoken to that mind and obeyed from cowardice or pride. And this obedience, so far from being education, is the

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very opposite of it. For it enslaves the mind rather than frees it ; enslaves it intellectually no less than morally. It imposes a uniformity rather than discovers that unity which is in the minds of all men ; imposes a set of values which are local and temporary rather than leads men to discover those values which are universal and everlasting.

Always, as I have said, education has been hampered by this sense of status ; always the theories of the great educators have been more or less perverted in practice, because there never has been a general desire in any society for equality of education. The arguments against it are very plausible. It is obviously absurd to attempt to educate the peasant in just the same way as the peer. Pestalozzi insisted, as Mr. Richmond points out, that " popular education must take the life of the people where it finds it, and, in awakening and developing the minds of children, must keep them in touch with the domestic realities among which they are growing up." Indeed the very effort to educate them above those realities is itself the result of a sense of status. It is an effort to make them fit for a superior class, not to improve the life of that class to which they belong. To despair of the common people, to establish a system of education which offers to the cleverest children a chance of escaping from their own class, that is only the

pedantic madness produced by the sense of status. What we need is an education that will enrich the life of all classes, of the poor and stupid no less than of the rich and clever ; and we cannot aim at such an education, or even conceive it, unless we empty our minds of the sense of status, and of intellectual no less than of social status. There must be peasants and we need an education that will teach them to be good peasants and will give them a chance of enjoying the peasant life. Such an education we cannot provide unless we cease altogether to despise peasants, to regard the peasant lot as the penalty of stupidity from which the cleverer children of the peasant class can be encouraged to escape. The brotherhood of the whole nation, that is what we should aim at in our education, and we cannot aim at it unless we rid ourselves of our own sense of status. If we despise the peasant, we shall teach him to despise his own lot, however artfully we may conceal our contempt from him. And in despising him or any other class, we shall pervert our education no less than his.

We are always talking about the minds of those who are to be educated, but in doing so we are apt to forget the mind of the educator. Yet every weakness in his mind, every wrong idea that he has absorbed from his surroundings, is sure to betray itself in his teaching. It is not enough that

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he shall know facts accurately or shall be able to impart them. If he has himself any sense of status, whether social or intellectual, he will impart it also like a poison to his pupils. The stupid ones he will make conscious of their stupidity, the clever he will make dangerously conscious of their cleverness ; and inevitably he will value most the kind of faculties which he himself possesses. So a pedant or a prig will train some of his pupils into pedants or prigs and others into a blind rebellion against his pedantry or priggishness. That is how the sense of intellectual status works and has worked all through the ages. It raises the same prejudice against education as is raised by the self-righteous against religion. But, as true religion destroys self-righteousness, so true education destroys the sense of status, and particularly of intellectual status. The pedant and the prig are men who have had a wrong education, as the Pharisee is one who has a wrong religion. By their fruits ye shall know them ; and humility is the fruit of true education as of true religion. .

Since Mr. Richmond has said so much in this book about the positive side of education, since he has traced the main ideas which have given life to it all through the ages, I may be excused perhaps for speaking of those errors which have deadened it all through the ages. The great negative task

for us now is to rid our education, for all classes, of this sense of status. Our ideal must be to educate all as men and women, as members of the nation, so that all may be able to enjoy the fulness of that life which the nation offers to its children. If we have that purpose we shall communicate it also to those whom we teach ; our whole education will be quickened by it, and we shall find a new meaning in the words, " Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these little ones ye have done it unto Me."

A. CLUTTON-BROCK.

THE PERMANENT VALUES IN EDUCATION

I

JEWISH AND GREEK IDEALS

THE stirring of a new sense of educational responsibility, in these days so strongly felt by all who are laying to heart the lessons of Europe's catastrophe, makes increasingly urgent the need for a unified body of educational doctrine. Diversity of aim and method has been not the least vital factor in the very real and enheartening progress of recent years ; but the need for a realized unity in diversity, nay, more, for an organized unity, is becoming more and more articulate as we look forward into times that will call aloud for a generation united in thoughtful citizenship and in enlightened goodwill. We are all aware that the approach to unity must be spontaneous and general if it is to be real. Organization in such a cause as ours must be no cut-and-dried system, but the expression of a continually developing impulse to unify and co-ordinate our ideals ; and we all feel it

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a duty to reach out and come into touch with the general aspiration—to become ourselves better citizens of the educational world.

In the general search for unifying principles we may be sure that one mode of mutual approach will be of constant and unique value: the seeking out of permanent educational truths that have vindicated their position in the past. Many such truths we can trace, unchanged despite all differences in their application, down to a definite place among the realized principles of our own day. Others we may find to have fallen into neglect; and it may well be that some of these half-forgotten truths will prove capable of bridging the gaps, or penetrating the barriers, that divide one realized educational principle from another and so give rise to unnecessary divergences of theory. It is with the hope of making some small contribution to a general synthesis of opinion that certain ideals of bygone civilizations and of the great educators of the past will be traced, in this and succeeding chapters, with regard to the educational questions that confront us now and for the future.

Let us start with a single instance, one of the most awkwardly two-edged questions that confront us when we think of the work that education has to do for the cause of the world's peace in the future. It is a question that finds an immediate if only a partial answer in the example of one of the peoples in the past. Our present desire is to train up a

generation whose life and hope need not be sacrificially poured out in the heroic prosecution of war, but may be turned to the wise maintenance of the peace that has her victories no less renowned ; and the desire brings us to a whole series of dilemmas, all part of the age-long paradox of war, with its heroisms and its horrors.

We face perhaps the most obvious dilemma that is before us when we ask what outlook upon war itself and upon preparedness for war is to be fostered in the minds of the young. Is the word to be Arm or Disarm ? Put in these terms the antithesis seems complete ; no middle course appears. Yet either precept carries its inevitable peril. Both principles leave out some essential safeguard ; both have that flavour of plausible onesidedness which characterizes a half-truth. To rearm is to pile up new potential for another orgy of destruction. To disarm is to surrender national vitality, strength of purpose and power for good, to a lax fatalism that might well invite the obliteration of our value among the civilizing forces of the world. It is a very real dilemma, and its solution is not to be found in any immediate, easy formula. But we can begin by casting back to see what efforts have been made by peoples in the past to combine the ideal of a purposeful vitality, strong to resist any suppression of its essential character, with the contrasted ideal of peaceful progress towards higher civilization, avoiding conflict and all the waste and

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wrong and horror that conflict involves. To take the earliest of such peoples whose history is on record, we find the problem continually to the fore, in a crude and simple form, in the early story of the Jewish race. Here are warriors who could fight grimly and nobly, yet whose ideal was to keep clear of conflict and of the warring powers around them. Their outlook so far justified itself that they excelled in civilization—if by civilization we mean the development of high human quality—all the great contemporary nations; and not only excelled, but survived them. What was the essential feature of the paternal or the priest-given education of the Jew? What must have been at the root of the teaching in those early Hebrew universities, the schools of the prophets, unique training grounds of wisdom and inspiration, of which the Old Testament gives us so tantalizing a glimpse? We might define it, for our purpose, as the inculcation of a supreme sense of the national conscience as residing in the individual. Some such sense has been known to us, in vague and childish form, perhaps, in the *esprit de corps* of a public school or a regiment; nationally we have known it all too little. The Prussian system, on the other hand, inculcates the exact opposite: a blind subservience to a conscienceless spirit of national self-aggrandizement. To any such spirit we may oppose, if we learn from the Jewish nation at its best, not the mere absence of a like evil in our own

midst, but the positive development of the nation's conscience, in microcosm, in every individual. Armed avowedly and manifestly for conscience sake, and on the sole ground that conscience unarmed is not yet safe in an imperfect world, a nation has adopted a principle which, once recognized, disarms the jealousy and mistrust that attend a blind accumulation of power.

But although the Jews realized this principle in part, their own story shows how easily they could forget it and run after the gods of power for power's sake. Their prophets taught not wholly but largely in vain. We shall have to consider in this survey of education not only the teaching of principles, but also the principles of teaching, which involve the turning of the ideal into the real, so that a right feeling may find anchorage in reality, and so be able to express itself consistently and increasingly in right action. But this is a theme for later consideration ; our first purpose is to elicit a few general ideals ; and the Jewish thought of self and society as a union having one conscience and one responsibility is carried as deep in the great literature of the prophets as the related thought of the union of both society and self with the will of God.

We may contrast with such an educational ideal the spirit fostered in one at least of the civilizations contemporary with the Jews, as that civilization is described by a Greek soldier-chronicler. Xenophon's account of Persian education can hardly be

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taken as simple reporting without ulterior motive ; he seems to idealize it somewhat, being anxious to commend its simplicities to the sophisticated Greeks of his time ; but the Persian system, with Xenophon's bias all in its favour, comes down to us as having its roots in a shallow principle. The interest of this is that it singularly resembles a principle still of wide acceptance and sufficiency among ourselves. Keep youth fit, and active, and honourable, and nothing else is of great account ; that is the prevailing note. The principle cannot be questioned in respect of its admirable positive content ; its peril is on the negative side, in the many things that it deliberately leaves out. It sufficed to grow human material for the building of a Persian empire, great and largely good ; it did not suffice to preserve the empire and the material from decay. Fitness and activity, alone, can build, but they cannot rightly enjoy—there supervenes a kind of fatty degeneration of the spirit. A code of honour left too much *in vacuo* is all too vulnerable in the later years. What were the things that the Persian system left out ? For a partial answer we may turn to Greek education.

To simplify very crudely a highly complex phenomenon, we may say that the keynote of Greek education at its best is a great and a pure æsthetic. The Greeks did know how to enjoy ; even those of the stoic reaction, who saw the danger of caring overmuch for the enjoyments of the senses, turned

only to a remoter and a subtler æstheticism. The Greek system superadded to a more than Persian code of fitness and honour a great faculty for fruition. It may be said that the ultimate and terrible decline of the Greek worship of beauty, moral, intellectual, and physical, cast Hellenism in the eyes of Rome, and so, later, of Christendom, under a cloud from which it has never fully emerged. The true Hellenism has never yet come back into its own, as we feel whenever we look at a Greek statue ; and if the civilization of to-day is sick and ugly and restless with materialism, it is largely for lack of that high power of fruition.

There is an urgency in healthy mankind to make and make, come what will of the making. At times the activity seems to be no higher than that of bees in a hive who, industrialized by the modern bee-keeper, go on making more and more honey in excess of their possible needs, knowing not at all what happens to the surplus. So it was in a measure for one stratum of the Greek community—the slaves, to whose importance in the Greek scheme of things we must presently look back ; but of the polity of Greek freemen it is broadly true to say that it possessed one indispensable inspiration that preserves the works of man from degenerating into a mere aimless, unhappy agglomeration of the wealth that Ruskin called “ illth ” and of the power that is only a peril. The Greeks made beauty, not in a few but in all their works, from sculpture and

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poetic drama to athleticism, from philosophy to politics ; and they made it because they wanted it. The desire that went to the making became the joy of fruition in achievement, and from that joy in turn sprang fresh desire, so long as Greece was healthy and made joy an active and creative, not a passive and consumptive, factor in life.

How the desire arose, unless it is native to the human spirit, it is impossible to say. How it grew and extended was by the continual impulse to new expression and new fruition. How the achievement of each generation was handed down to the next through the educational system—apart from the sense in which all Greece was in itself an educational system—is well told in the late Mr. Kenneth Freeman's book, *Schools of Hellas*. Our concern here is rather with the æsthetic principle as a value that has permanent significance in education. Is it possible that Greece was wrong ? Greece fell ; was the fall because of, or in spite of, the æsthetic principle ? To compare our own systems with the Hellenic it would almost seem as though we had decided upon the former opinion. It is easy, by a simple confusion of mind, to drift into the belief that a sense of beauty is a very good thing in moderation, but that too much of it is dangerous. The good sense that lurks in this belief depends upon a loose employment of the term "too much"—a purely relative term that is often used, to save thinking, as though it meant something in itself. A very little

thought brings conviction that it is impossible to have too much sense of beauty, but that it is entirely possible to lack the other principles which can preserve an intense feeling for the beautiful upon the pathway of high aspiration, and keep the way of hedonistic degeneracy closed.

For a long time Hellenism kept its poise and proportion—for long enough to build up a standard of human living that has in many ways been unapproached and unapproachable ever since. It turned the high achievement of Greece in that friendly conquest of nature—including human nature—which is called civilization, into an exemplary work of art—of that true art which is the harmonious re-interpretation of Nature. If Hellenism, conserving for a time and marvellously embellishing what Greece had won, could not in the end conserve itself, the cause must surely be sought not in any taint inherent in beauty, but in the lack of some other principles of permanence that must be the object of our further quest.

Meanwhile, is it idle to talk of beauty when the thought at the back of our minds is the rebuilding of a shattered Europe? There is no good building without beauty, whether we speak of architecture or of the structures of spirit. And to revert for a moment to the Jewish ideal, can the union of self and society in a State that has both consciousness and conscience be achieved in a civilization which disregards beauty? There is a danger that educa-

tion may neglect beauty in the interests of stern reality, just as there has been a danger that the State might neglect education, which is economy, in the interests of economy. Little doubt will be left whether this investigation of ours leads to reality in education. The doubt that needs to be raised is whether reality can be found without invoking the spirit of Praxiteles as well as of Isaiah. And those whose only watchword is economy might be attracted by the suggestion that, aiming at beauty in simplification, we should economize in unnecessary ugliness.

II

ROMAN AND MEDIEVAL IDEALS

WE have seen that the unique faculty of fruition developed by the Greeks did not suffice to conserve their civilization. Something gave way. A lesion appeared in the Greek organism. We all know why, if we are content with a negative explanation : Greek civilization was founded, economically, upon slavery. The crude, indispensable physical ultimates of social life were the hopeless privilege of slaves ; while the masters of Greece, the initiate of her mysteries, became divorced in increasing measure from reality, and their æsthetic attainment became an accelerating landslide into eroticism. The Greek joy in beauty lost its creativeness ; the impulse to make, which is nothing if it is not also the impulse to serve, faded from a social order where service carried the stigma of servitude, where work and enjoyment came more and more to be thought the concern of different castes. Creative joy dies out in a world of the ready-made.

Slavery is the negative reason for the Greek *dégringolade* ; but it is of the positive factors that we are in search. What, in positive terms, was the

missing principle in a system that evolved a high æsthetico-moral ideal, a glorious art, and the least unsatisfactory political method known to history, and yet fell into decadence? Freedom, of course, is the antithesis of slavery. But we must be patient for a while. Freedom is not to be pinned down by a word or a phrase. We must wait for Rousseau before we find even a naive and unbalanced expression of social liberty as an educational ideal, though we shall see the reality in some degree accomplished in medieval times.

Those who inherited the Greek empire of ideas did not even inherit all the Greek inspiration of partial freedom. The Romans, inspired by the Hellenistic ideal, had to interpret that ideal within the compass of their own heroic but materialistic limitations. Primarily Rome sought another aspect of the great truth; and Rome also failed in the very climax of success. But the Roman spirit imported a new ideal into the history of civilization, an ideal that has survived the changes of fifteen hundred years. To-day in any discussion of respective national values a Frenchman identifies himself proudly with *la race latine*. He appeals thereby to no racial fact, as the ethnologists remind us with tired persistence, but to an idea. The *res publica* embodied a thought that has had a common meaning for the Gracchi, for Cæsar Augustus, for Charlemagne, and for the idealists of the French Revolution. Every Gothic and Frankish combination in

the middle history of Europe that aspired to unify the European peoples sought the sanction of the old title and called itself a Roman empire. This was not only for the associations of power and dominion that the name carried. Rome was not only a name of power ; the title symbolized a claim to reliance and loyalty that rests upon more than force. There was a kind of vast homeliness about the Roman ideal. The Romans themselves were not only conquerors first, protectors afterwards, and finally, in their decadence, parasites upon the peoples whom they had conquered. There was something other than the sense of Rome's protection that made a Briton of the second century proud to be enrolled a Roman citizen. Rome was possessed of a certain unifying spirit ; and it is a spirit that has haunted Western Europe from the time of the Gothic irruption upon Rome's decadence until the present day. Can we identify any aspect of this spirit with a corresponding aspect of Roman education ?

The essence of Roman teaching was Rome. In the days of Rome's ascendant greatness citizenship was taught as perhaps it has never been taught before or since. And the person to whom we have first to look for an explanation is the Roman mother. It was deliberately made an essential part of the Roman system that for seven years a child should be in his mother's keeping. The State stood aside, and trusted to maternal care ; and we know that

that which is trusted, grows. Roman motherhood, growing in influence and responsibility, grew into alliance with the Roman ideal as a whole. Those first seven years of the Roman child's life were all important. *Roma Dea* herself directed the first determining perceptions and ideals of her sons and daughters, in the person of the Roman matron; and this was possible by reason of a splendid identification between motherhood and the motherland. Roman motherhood, invested with all the dignity of Rome, vindicated its high status naturally and inevitably; and the soul of his country for the Roman was made visible in the sight or memory of the eyes into which he had looked most deeply as a child. This was feminine enfranchisement indeed. Can we hope for the reattainment of such an ideal, as modern womanhood rises to a new dignity of service? Past vagaries of agitation apart, a new order is organically accomplishing itself; and it may be that our millions of domestic glories and tragedies to-day are destined to have a collective outcome in the deeper recognition of what motherhood means to the State. Further, there is promise in the growing tendency of the modern educated mother towards an eager realization of opportunities rather than an alarmed desire to delegate responsibilities.

It does not follow that if we come to effect a revaluation of the Roman motherhood-ideal in our own times we shall have to make the same demand upon the time and energy of mothers as the Romans

made. Our conditions are widely different from theirs, to say the least ; and it is the essence of the enfranchisement that is actually taking place, apart from its political symbol and instrument, that women are finding wider spheres of interest and influence in every activity that affects the conditions of to-day. On the other side of the picture we have the kindergarten and the Montessori school developing methods of teaching the young child which at their best are essentially motherly, and very much more educative than the methods that any but a tiny minority of mothers could apply. Does this mean a delegation of the mother's responsibilities? It should mean only their better expression through a higher social organization. All civilized advance depends upon increasing division of labour, upon increasing specialism coupled with increasing co-operation ; and the expert teacher of young children is a specialist who co-operates with the mother to effect a higher expression of maternal responsibility than the mother could contrive by herself. But our danger lies always in producing our specialists and then forgetting about the co-operation ; we achieve differences of function without the unity in diversity that gives them value, if we neglect the link of a union in understanding and aim between the specialist and those for whom the specialist works.

An imitation Romanism that would close the kindergartens and infant schools and send the

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children back to their nurseries—or to distracted kitchen living-rooms—is not a revaluation of the Roman idea. We can see the true revaluation being brought about in the increase of maternal interest in and understanding of the work of schools, giving hope that co-operation between home and school may become a vital interchange, and the school a true reflection of the desires of an understanding motherhood. A Roman mother, reincarnate in these times, can hardly be imagined as resting satisfied with getting her “jewels” conveniently out of the way, or remaining detached from the activities of their daily absence. And the modern State, realizing that it cannot usurp the function of mother-training without the inspiration of mother wit, may perhaps learn to enlist the co-operation of mothers along the lines that private philanthropy has already begun to mark out. But much thoughtful care is needed to translate the spontaneous simplicity of the Roman system into terms of the complex realities of to-day.

We leave aside a great body of interesting detail with regard to Roman education in thus abstracting the ideal of State motherhood for a central generalization; and we must recognize that this, like all generalizations, is in part a figure of speech. But, in making it, we are endeavouring to symbolize, if no more, a great underlying reality of Roman life. And it is interesting to watch the progress and the continuity in change of this motherhood-ideal. The

Christian era came upon a Rome already sickening from the luxury and artificiality that resulted from her parasitism upon the provinces. *Roma Dea* had become gross and lazy, a cushioned deity. What more natural than that a mother Church should begin to take her place—that a Church in process of formation and organization should seek to satisfy the demand for a motherhood-ideal? Gradually but completely the Church took over the function of universalized motherhood, and did much, we may think, if not all, to conserve it in safe harbourage through the welter and chaos that succeeded the Gothic irruption.

As comparative order grew out of chaos there began what may be summarized as the Romantic Era, with chivalry as its fundamental note. The motherhood-ideal had found its shrine and its position of mild, austere dignity in Church worship, and the *preux chevalier* found his secular inspiration in the Lady of the Lists. It may be something more than a fancy that this universal spirit of knightly romance had its correspondence with the principal fact of the times: civilization was now not a mother to be revered, but a mistress to be won. It is typical of the synthetic genius of Charlemagne, the author of the finest of all the attempts at a new "Roman Empire" and of the attempt that had the most lasting influence, that he should have seen educational opportunity in the stirrings and strivings of the knightly impulse, and laboured to unify the

teaching of chivalry with the religious and scholarly training of the monastic schools. Not only did he develop the famous "palace school" that accompanied the Royal Court from place to place into a genuinely educational institution, with the help of the eighth-century English educator, Alcuin of York; his capitularies of the years 787 and 789, containing instructions to the heads of schools, bear witness to the zealous care with which he and Alcuin supervised and broadened the activities of the monastic schools themselves. Our own Board of Education circulars breathe no deeper spirit of solicitude.

Knighthood alone, and romantic knighthood at that, for all its splendour of spirit, might well have led the social order of the Middle Ages into a blind alley, but that its very character, generously un-repressive in the main, permitted the growth of another and a complementary ideal. It was not a knightly and a priestly order in sole alliance that produced Gothic architecture, that amazing proof of a sustained and an ever-developing corporate vitality. The successive miracles of the Gothic bear witness to the long continuance of a fine ideal of craftsmanship and to the high regard in which the individual craftsman was held. Greek architecture could be noble and free in design but slavish in execution; nothing but the labour and the love of free men could have built the cathedral of Chartres or Lincoln. Besides the primary pervading influence of

the Christian spirit of common worship and service there was an education that upheld and developed the ideal of craftsmanship. It was almost entirely an education of apprenticeship in studio and workshop, though it is likely that the burghers' schools, the educational institutions of the well-to-do merchant class, contributed in the awakening of young minds to thought and appreciation that bore fruit later in noble design or in generous and discriminating support for the work of others.

We shall touch later upon the causes, often enough expounded by now, of the decline of craftsmanship, and upon the broad lines along which it may perhaps be revived as a living and a civilizing force. William Morris and his school have done much—very much more than is generally realized—not to revive the old ideal in its old form (always a hopeless task for reformers, whose business indeed is the re-forming of the old), but to make the revaluation of the old ideal the inspiration of the new. The work done in some of our county schools, reflecting the inspiration of Morris in every harmony of thought with substance, bears witness to a true revival that is struggling to make itself felt. But meanwhile many idealist workers in the same field have treated the subject of craftsmanship as though nothing were possible but a sheer, uncompromising return to the medieval ideal as it was, which would involve an impossible return—fortunately impossible in most respects—to medieval conditions. Can

it be hoped that our sporadic and tentative little colonies of medievalist handworkers will reassemble after the war to be the seed of a new luxuriance of free craftsmanship? Probably the most they can do is to keep a spark of the old ideal alive—a far from negligible function. A much greater hope lies in broadening the basis of education till every worker grows up a craftsman in thought and feeling—and until the term “worker” becomes a title of honour, bestowed upon craftsmanship of mind and hand alike, not the supercilious label of a class distinction. This is part of a very necessary revolution in our educational system—a revolution that the gigantic shock of war may help to bring about, and a revolution that would give us a new and a more stable social order by a process of natural and organic development—an order quite different, in all likelihood, from any that has been propounded, ready-made, by the wisest of political theorists.

We can use so slippery a phrase as “broadening the basis” of education only in earnest of an attempt to define what it should imply, not only in relation to labour and craftsmanship, but to the whole field of educational problems. Pursuing our roughly historical method we find that from the Middle Ages onwards educational ideals become crystallized in the teaching of individual educators; and it is in tracing the main tendencies to which certain of these great representatives have given expression that we shall hope, now, to elicit some general

synthesis of educational beliefs. The passions that inspired the great achievements of civilization in the past are, in a sense, irrecoverable ; in an exact and literal sense nothing can be again what it has been. But there is no bygone ideal that cannot find its reincarnation in the thought of some new pioneer ; and the great educators of our own era have revitalized, as we shall see, much of the inspiration that has been the glory of the past, besides foreshadowing the ideals on which our hope for the future depends.

This chapter has omitted, or passed over with a couple of bare, tentative references, the introduction into education, as into the story of civilized life as a whole, of a greater uplifting and civilizing force than any upon which this book will directly touch. The opening of the Christian epoch raises questions that go far wider and deeper than the Roman ideal of State motherhood or the medieval ideals of chivalry and of craftsmanship. But the direct teaching of Christianity has become a controversial subject, so intricately controversial that a book of this character could not attempt to disengage the issues that are involved in it. If this is a confession of weakness, it is only one voice in a general confession. Among the things left undone that we ought to have done has been the bringing out of the unity that underlies the diversities of religious thought ; and the result is intellectual chaos in spiritual matters. We shall trace the gradual

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struggle of educational thought towards the educational unities ; and it may be that with man's still further realization of these a spirit will be bred that will dispute less about Christ's teachings and carry them out more.

III

THE RENAISSANCE

IT is difficult to imagine the glow of enthusiasm amid which the foundations were laid of our tradition of classical culture, when the spirit of Hellas was a glorious rediscovery and teachers of Greek were sought out eagerly and with difficulty by those who had caught a spark of the new fire that was abroad. It is all too easy, on the other hand, to forget the magnitude of our debt to the early humanist educators, remembering only the formalism and sterility into which the classical side of their ideal, divorced from their abundant vitality of interest in natural science, speedily lapsed in the hands of their later misinterpreters. It was precisely such formalism against which they warred, and so often warred in vain. The lifeless scholiast reappears in every generation ; and Petrarch's scathing account of the teaching of his times is applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to much of our classical work to-day. But the right reaction from a dead classicism must always be in the direction of a live classicism, not of a revolt against the misused classics themselves. The inheritance of the true

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classic spirit always has been, and perhaps always will be, the privilege, or the choice, of the few ; but those few are the guardians of a fountain of living water upon whose continued flow an essential part of the vitality of literature and philosophy depends.

Neither is their guardianship without the value that is called practical, though we may recall the fact only when such an incident occurs as the calling of an eminent scholar and literary critic to the rescue of military education, because subalterns, products of our public school training in classic literature, were found incapable of writing a lucid dispatch. This particular occurrence of only a few years ago points with a neatness all its own to the double moral that formal classicism stifles, and that what formal classicism has stifled only living classicism can revive. But the influence of live scholarship, which means something other than a scholarship that so neglects the mother tongue as to teach the translating of *Æschylus* to English boys who have never been taught to translate *Chaucer*, touches the practical side of life at a thousand points. To neglect classics for the practicalities of science is exactly as foolish as to neglect science for classics. How much of the prevailing ignorance of the teachings of science, in such matters as child-welfare for example, is due on the one hand to lack of the sound literary training that makes for intelligent reading, and on the other to the expression of the root conclusions of science in

language bristling with unnecessary technicalities and devoid of scholarly lucidity ?

Something very like our modern trouble in determining the place of science was to follow the partial decline of humanist education, when the "realists" began to assert the advantages of scientific training. But it must not be forgotten that the best early exponents of the classic ideal were also those who best paved the way for the coming realist movement. Vittorius was "the first modern schoolmaster" ; Melanchthon, a classical enthusiast, advocated the addition of physics, mathematics, and astronomy to school curricula ; Erasmus, a humanist *par excellence*, wished to introduce geography, arithmetic, and natural science. The realist educators are often regarded as having saved the educational situation when the humanists had landed the schools in hopeless formalism ; it would be more true to say that they carried on and developed the work of the best humanists, though it is true enough that they carried it out of the reach of many unworthy heirs of the humanist ideal. Then, as now, there was a classic spirit that was ready and eager to reach out and come into touch with the modern, conscious of its own vitality and of all that it had to give as well as to gain by contact with the newer developments of thought. Then, as at all times and in all human activities, there was a self-sufficient band of formalists receding from educational evolution along their appointed blind alley ; but, essen-

tially, the task of the great reformers, "humanist" and "realist" alike, was not transition, but synthesis. The shade of Vittorius would have hailed the later and completer educational system of Comenius with rejoicing, though, if we imagine the shade of John Sturm, he who cut down the breaks between school periods in order to diminish the risk of his boys talking together in their mother-tongue instead of in Latin, looking over the shoulder of Comenius as the latter wrote his *Pansophia*, we can only conceive his expression as one of bewilderment mingled with the gravest suspicion.

The Latinity, even the Ciceronianism, of Vittorius was essentially spontaneous and alive; his Hellenism was intellectual vitality itself, and led naturally into a wide field of scientific and philosophical inquiry. It is the teacher whose mental life is a joy to him who can educate by inspiring positive enthusiasms and need have little or no recourse to negative restrictions and taboos. These, and the harsh discipline necessary to enforce them, were the work of later misinterpreters of the early humanist message, who drew down the gigantesque ridicule of Rabelais and the polished criticism of Montaigne. "We toil," wrote the latter, "only to stuff the memory, and leave the conscience and understanding void." The short-sighted attempt to impose a scholastic taboo upon the study and even the use of the vernacular must have been largely responsible for lifeless work and ferocious punishments. The

gentle Ascham pointed the way, as did Montaigne, to a revival of the true humanist spirit ; while Richard Mulcaster, severe but inspiring, boldly preached training in the mother tongue. " It would have been a vast gain to all Europe," as Mr. R. B. Quick has observed, " if Mulcaster had been followed instead of Sturm."

It was largely against the inhumanity of the pseudo " humanists," an inhumanity that was intellectual as well as personal, that the realist school reacted. The Spaniard Vives was perhaps the first tentative pioneer of realist method, and it is noteworthy that he is also remembered for two achievements which give evidence of a wide sense of human values : a treatise embodying one of the first systematic schemes for the care of the poor, and another on the Instruction of a Christian Woman, which strongly recalls the Roman motherhood-ideal, while anticipating much that has since been accomplished in the fulfilment of women's claim to education. Indeed, it is as a humanist in the modern and extended sense rather than as a realist in the technical sense that Vives stands out. He was instinctively attracted to natural science as a means of educational development, but he was timorous of adventuring far in this direction, and did little more than advocate a " silent contemplation of nature." Even this, he felt bound to remark, " may prove dangerous to those not deeply grounded in faith," an observation that throws a sudden light

upon the concealed conflict between faith and fact which was then finding expression in the heart-burnings of the Reformation. We may say that of realist method Vives gave no more than a preliminary hint, the record of an aspiration almost unfulfilled. But he did much to clear the ground of lumber. His attacks on the scholastic dignity that will not humble itself to seek out truth for its own sake, and his deprecation of the personal ambition of teachers, so often associated with pretentiousness, are not without their warning for the specialist educators of our own day ; and his partial unravelling of the dense tangle into which educational method had grown simplified the task of his greater successor Comenius, as the latter himself testified, though he added that Vives "understood better where the fault lay than what might be the remedy." Further, it is probable that Vives, through his association with Erasmus and More, had a not inconsiderable influence upon English educational thought, particularly upon that of the English philosopher who most definitely furthered the realist cause.

The great educational service of Francis Bacon was to formulate and systematize a realization of Nature and natural law that before his time had been largely instinctive and inarticulate. The ideal of the artist-craftsman, continually renewing its inspiration through close and keen observation of Nature, had developed a certain intuitive understanding of the ways of Nature, but it remained to

bring that understanding to the conscious surface. Bacon felt intensely the need to enrich the intellectual life, "cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit," by the direct study of natural causation. "We stamp the seal of our own image upon the creatures and works of God, instead of carefully searching for and acknowledging the seal of the Creator manifest in them." The words are still true of too much of our secondary education to-day, and not only in the continued survival of that odd anachronism, the exclusive "classical side." Science teaching itself is barely beginning to emerge from its preoccupation with three or four narrowly-conceived specialist "sciences" into a cognizance of the fundamentals upon which so much of modern progressive thought is based. We have to look to the elementary schools for any general realization of first principles, for the beginnings of a real study of "that speech and language whose lines have gone out into all the earth, and no confusion of tongues has ever befallen it."

In the sixteenth century, as in the nineteenth, resistance to the demand for broader curricula was largely due to the mechanical difficulty of finding time for new studies. In both cases the obstacle consisted, more than the objectors realized, in the involution and partial atrophy of method in teaching which had become sacrosanct through custom. Our own time has had the advantage, for those who

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would avail themselves of it, of an enlightened methodology developed during three hundred years of progressive experience. But one of the main facts of that experience is still largely unlearned. We continually hear talk of the danger of "overcrowding the curriculum" whenever a claim is put forward for some neglected branch of knowledge or activity. It sounds as though a curriculum, the ordering of the subjects that a school undertakes to teach, were a work of art and its own justification, like the picture to which the painter's friends implore him not to add another touch for fear of spoiling it. The business of the curriculum is to combine the things that are necessary to be learned; and the history of education shows, as indeed we might have expected, that the number and diversity of these things are continually increasing with the number and diversity of man's activities and interests. It is of no use to bewail a fact that is not only a consequence but a cause of man's advance, or to complain of a difficulty, inherent in the nature of things, which education has always had to face. To say that our curricula will not hold what is necessary is to confess that we are allowing them to become rigid and inextensible, although the power continually to extend their capacity is a power without which education would gradually and steadily cease to be education, and become a somewhat uninteresting branch of archæology. Happily, this extreme is never reached. The backward type

of education either dies a belated and an unlamented death, or the new and necessary knowledge adopts the attitude of Alice towards the Mad Tea-Party. "No room! No room!" is the cry of the March Hare and the Mad Hatter upon Alice's arrival. "There's plenty of room!" says Alice, and quietly takes her seat at the table. The subsequent verbal quibbles in which the Mad Hatter indulges are not without their resemblance to a certain scholastic verbalism that goes far to explain the cry of "No time!" so often raised by the scholiast.

In a sense, the history of education is simply the history of the curriculum's expansion, and the greatest educators have been those who contrived to expand it to the best purpose. A prospective glance at the two principal factors of expansion may facilitate our further study of the process, since it was not yet a consciously realized process, and its development easily escapes the attention among the many other considerations that will demand our notice. Without these two factors the extension of the curriculum would mean either the accumulation of "subjects" and the mounting up of the hours needed for their study until the limitations of human endurance put a merciful end to the process, or the treatment of these manifold "subjects" so thinly and briefly that nothing would be taught but smatterings—a word that generally closures any modern discussion of a further extension of the curriculum.

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The first need that we find supplied by the great educators is the need for simplification. Hand in hand with the natural process by which necessary knowledge becomes continually more abundant and diverse, there fortunately goes another natural process by which the mind of man becomes increasingly capable of boiling down the manifold of detail to its essentials. This faculty is to be observed, often in impressive measure, in all the great educators. They simplify knowledge by centralizing it.

The second need springs immediately to the mind in corrective criticism of the first. The detail must not be lost. The boiling-down process must not leave education with no mental food to give but a kind of concentrated extract of knowledge, predigested in the mind of the teacher. Here we seem to find the former dilemma only a single stage further advanced. How is all the necessary detail to be worked in? We shall return to this question later on, with the example before us of actual methods by which its solution has been approached; but it may enlighten our search to anticipate in some degree the conclusion that emerges. Our aim is to make two ideas grow where only one grew before. But suppose we seem to be already overcrowding the minds of the young with diverse ideas? We cannot make two blades of corn grow where only one grew before if every square yard of ground already holds as many roots as it can feed—provided that weeds have been exterminated; and

there is a limit to the use of concentrated fertilisers. But two ears of corn cannot be grown from the same root ; two ideas can, and many more than two. The principle of which we find ourselves in search is one that shall make it possible to develop common roots in the mind for many and diverse aspects of knowledge ; and the method for the carrying out of that principle must be one that frees time and mental energy by making one effort of comprehension on the learner's part do the work of two. It is by a method of this kind, if we come to think of it, that the mind of man itself has evolved.

The humanist and realist methods, at one in their original inspiration, fell at the end of the sixteenth century into a disputatious diversity of case-hardened scholastic systems. With the seventeenth century educational methods began to be simplified and rationally co-ordinated, and it thus became possible for the schools greatly to extend their range of thought. We have next to investigate the ideals and the influence of the founder of the modern synthetic curriculum, Comenius, who looked upon the educational world of his day and cried, " Oh, that God would have pity on us, and recollect us from this dispersion ! "

IV

COMENIUS AND THE "PAN-SOPHICAL WAY"

A GREAT hall, nobly proportioned, hung with pictures ; behind us, the imposing entrance-way by which we have just been admitted ; before and on either side of us, seven doorways, each with its inscription, its call to the intellectual and spiritual ambition of the learner : " Let no one enter who is ignorant of natural philosophy " ; " Let no one enter who cannot reason " ; " Let no one enter who is irreligious." Thus the last three legends of the series ; above the portal of the first class-room, that into which children of seven and eight are trooping, the inscription is " Let no one enter who cannot read," for Comenius is an enthusiast for the " mother's seven years " of the Roman system, and has written an inspiring book for the guidance of the mother who would fit her child for entrance into the great pansophical school.

It is not easy to give a concise account of the ideals pursued and the methods employed in this magnificent temple of learning, because the temple was never built in its entirety, and to this day much

of the architect's conception of the completed edifice remains unrealized. Also, the plans that Comenius left enshrined in the monumental folio whose publication the world owes to the discriminating generosity of his Dutch patrons, the de Geers, suggest many variants of the essential Comenian system. As a writer, Comenius, like other great educational theorists, was rhetorical and diffuse, easily carried away by his own symbolism ; his consistent desire, we may be sure, was to get concrete material under his hand and to mould and fashion an actual school according to the promptings of his own inspiration when confronted with the daily and yearly problems set by real conditions. This he could do but seldom, and never for long enough to give effect to his whole synthetic purpose. But perhaps it is not all a matter for regret that the military alarms and excursions of his time so harried him from place to place. A single finished achievement, a perfected pansophic school brought to full realization in Moravia or Transylvania, might have proved premature in an age of whose educational thought Comenius was so many centuries in advance. The genius ahead of his time often functions best as a sower of seeds ; and Comenius as a wanderer scattered seeds of educational reform broadcast, of which many sprung up, and many more were carried by other and smaller birds of passage into every country in Europe.

Critical appreciators of Comenius are prone to temper their enthusiasm by the use of a word that

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seriously misinterprets the Moravian master's ideal. For the word "pansophic," with which he elected to label his system, they are always substituting the very different term "encyclopædic," with the implication that it connotes the same idea. Nothing could be less true to educational fact. Because every student of Comenius' writings is torn between admiration for their lofty idealistic value and a commonsense reluctance to be swept off his feet by their emotional rhetoric—to say nothing of certain promptings of the comic spirit that their *naïveté* now and again invites—we are by no means called upon to minimize their central inspiration, still less to falsify it. Encyclopædic teaching is neither practicable nor desirable; "pansophic" teaching is both. The one aims at making the learner an inexhaustible mine of information upon every subject, the other would make him capable of wisdom in his regard for any subject, and able to see any subject in relation to others and to general principles. "Encyclopædism, not of acquired knowledge, but of faculty and interest—that is what we aim at," writes Professor Laurie; but this is twisting the word out of its accepted meaning. "Universalism" would perhaps be a fitter term, and would at any rate evade association with the views of the French *encyclopédistes*.

A demand for universalized knowledge, even if we have cleared away the notion that it means a desire to pack the whole universe into the brain of

every child, must be recognized to be a demand of immense magnitude. The Comenian precept brushes aside the war of “ subjects ” with the sweeping simplicity of a single formula : Teach everything. Some instinct of the mind rises at once in response ; after all, we say to ourselves, this is exactly what education is for, once it is granted that education is not a process akin to the packing of a portmanteau for a journey, but rather to the equipment of a workshop with tools. The mind is not so much a receptacle as an instrument, and an instrument that has to be adaptable to a countless and an increasing variety of uses. Conscious of the ever-impending call for fresh adaptations of the mind and fuller powers of grasp, if new developments of knowledge are not to fall into an increasing sterility of specialization, we may well decide that education must hurry to widen our touch with to-day’s knowledge, before the knowledge of to-morrow is upon us.

But there is a countervailing instinct that rises in dignified and, within limits, very reasonable protest against allowing ourselves to be hustled in this fashion by the evolution of our own minds. This, at its best, is a form of the instinct which reminds us to make sure of our unities before admitting fresh diversity ; and in this respect it has from Comenius the strongest support that could be desired, as is shown by his careful arrangement of the successive stages through which his pupils were to pass—a type of arrangement which, as carefully and

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logically applied in our public school curricula, would more than double their effectiveness and capacity. But the instinct of resistance to the demands of universalism has in it also something of the academic spirit that says "leave me, leave me to repose," and, left to repose, sinks into a graceful euthanasia. To keep an educational atmosphere unchanged is to become progressively if painlessly stifled by it. This is a very different matter from the sound conservatism that fears lest man may drop his tested values to run a nightmare race with his own evolution.

Fears, however, although we can see their use in promoting necessary caution, do not give even to conservatism its highest inspiration. Conservatism can be too fearful and too cautious to conserve; and educational conservatism has failed to conserve the tradition of Comenius through fear of universalism. But universalism is essentially a conservative principle; it is the elements of knowledge and of wisdom that are detached and circumscribed in the mind which get lost the most easily, and the only safe mooring-lines for a truth are its relations with a universe of truths. Why is it, then, that the fear of universalism arises?

Education upon "pansophic" lines, even if it were to embrace only the knowledge of Comenius's day, makes a colossal demand upon the mental equipment of the teacher, both in knowledge of fact and in ability to trace the relations between

facts and to co-ordinate them into a whole. If the child is not to be made encyclopædic, it seems as though the teacher must be ; and there is required of him a power “ to see life steadily, and see it whole ” in all its countless activities, which very few teachers, and those few mistakenly, believe themselves to possess. There is nothing wrong with an unattainable standard ; on the contrary there is only a very limited use for standards that are attainable. The ideal of complete all-round knowledge cannot be realized, but it is worth striving for, and its rewards are not at the unattainable end but at every stage of the struggle. And we are all aware that teachers as a rule know far too little outside the range of their chosen “ subjects ”—so little that their “ subjects,” however painstakingly studied and taught, suffer continually from lack of reference to anything outside themselves. The fear is not that the ideal may be pursued but that it may be pursued in the wrong way.

Encyclopædism is precisely the wrong way, for the teacher as much as for the taught, if we use the word in its accepted sense. It is an abstraction of the substance from the spirit of knowledge ; an abstraction made by the conscientious student who, anxious for milestones that may reassure him of his progress, makes the acquisition of a given body of tangible fact his criterion of advance. This is to snatch at the substance and miss the all-important

shadow that tells in what direction the light is falling ; and it is our direction in regard to the light of reality that matters. The achievement of Comenius was to express in his system a more real criterion of advance than this. Its nature can perhaps be better illustrated than described. The public school boy says : " We did chemistry last term, and next term we are going to do physics. We don't do Greek." The " pansophic " pupil's explanation to the home circle can better be imagined in some such form as this : " Comenius says that we cannot be philosophers till we have begun to think like scientists, and that then we shall learn Greek which is the key to philosophy." The Comenian pupil lived, of course, in an age when it was quite good form for a boy to admit that he took an interest in thought. The spirit of the Renaissance had not yet become a thing to be shamefacedly concealed.

Comenius not only reawakened this spirit, but gave it consciousness ; and in the phrase " consciousness of knowledge " we may perhaps find a partial expression of the aim that lifted his system above the intellectual error of encyclopædism. He taught children to feel joy in the mental power that they were gradually learning to wield ; and this joy in understanding leads naturally to a reaching-out for further knowledge, essentially different from the mere collector's spirit which loves to accumulate facts. A child does not only need to know ; he wants to be the knower, to feel the power of com-

prehension gathering in himself and extending its reach. All children are born universalists. From the day of their birth we can watch the first, elementary workings of their instinctive desire to understand the universe. The desire, rightly fed, grows continuously through life, always extending its vision and its grasp. Fostered during immaturity by the educational process, it does not end there, but goes on in the never-ending process of self-education through experience of life.

A study of the magnificent ideal that inspires the writings of Comenius is apt to leave the reader girding at the generations that followed, and our own in particular, for the obtuseness and the lack of vision that prevented them from realizing the ideal in its fulness. Much of the volume of accusation that arises in the mind is well founded ; but it has to be remembered that the universalism of Comenius was a giant's step upwards from the usual practice of education. We are not required, in the interests of the new generation, to sacrifice ourselves and become exemplars of the encyclopædic mind ; very much the contrary. But we are faced with a still more difficult demand. To teach universalism we have to be universalists ourselves, and this means that we are required to leap, ourselves, to a position which we expect to make attainable for our successors only through a universalist training from childhood. In these terms, the demand becomes impossible. But we can see the possibility of a

gradual attempt to grasp and increasingly to express in our teaching the essence of the universalist outlook ; and we shall see that the methods of subsequent educators make the task distinctly less formidable. A formidable task, like an ideal that cannot wholly be attained, attracts rather than repels when steps towards gradual achievement become visible, and we shall come upon a very useful step-ladder later on. Meanwhile the first essential step is so to study Comenius as to see what he desired, and the second is to consider whether any of his methods can be revalued in terms of our own.

It is easy to render lip-service to the pansophic ideal ; it is more difficult to enter into its spirit. We have dwelt first upon the most intangible quality in the works of Comenius because concentration upon his methodology alone, as upon that of any great educator, permits the evaporation of that fine essence which is the soul of the system. And when we inquire what was the point of method first in importance for the fulfilment of his ideal, we shall do well to keep the essential Comenian atmosphere in mind, and to ask by what means it was created and sustained. A sense of orderly progression from plateau to higher plateau of knowledge was to pervade the school ; not only the fact, but the delighted consciousness of it. It is seldom that we shall be able to elicit a direct and immediately practicable hint for any and every teacher from our present study of main principles ; the great requirements

can as a rule be realized only through co-operation and the growth of a common impulse ; but here is a point upon which every individual can not only hold an opinion, but give it effect. For the task of social regeneration and reconstruction that lies before us there is need, before any other quality of the mind, of enlightened foresight. Do we, to any appreciable extent, direct our educational methods towards the attainment of this quality ? Are we not far too much inclined, in actual teaching, to stick to the present, to keep the child's vision bounded by the small, precise achievement of the moment ? This is surely as uneducative as would be the opposite fault of neglecting the necessary step-by-step plodding for the sake of a purely visionary outlook. Children are often pulled up and told to attend to the business in hand when their seeming digression from the subject is the first immature sign of a desire to get its bearings in the cosmos, and to look forward along the vista that it is beginning to open up for them. Unwillingness to welcome this tendency, and to direct and foster it by every means that can be thought out, means failure to develop from its early stages that very faculty of wise foresight whose possession we so desire for the coming generation.

Another point of Comenian method gives food for speculation over a wider field than that of the teacher's individual task. Among the formulæ of the Pansophic School stress is continually laid on the

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precept "teach one thing at a time." This application to didactics of what proverbially "is a very good rule" might perhaps be better represented in modern method. Even a tentative experiment in actual school work shows very quickly that intensive culture of successive subjects is a natural and a repaying process, if—the largest of ifs—it is combined with extensive treatment of the widest sort. It was his recognition of the latter necessity that led Comenius to envisage the idea of correlation a couple of centuries before Herbart. We may think that Comenius rode too hard his hobby of regarding subjects as successive goals for the child's ambition, and it is noteworthy that it takes a more modest place when he is describing those parts of the pansophic system that he had been able to work out in full practice ; but there is much to be said for it none the less, in the hands of teachers who realize that the study of one thing is only the study of one aspect of everything. It would, of course, remain for careful consideration which subjects are the best suited for such treatment, and which flourish best under continuous study, "little and often." The allocation to appropriate subjects, for a few weeks each, let us say, of comfortably long periods, with much heuristic and objective work and no rushing or scamping, would have three distinct advantages. It is preparation for a type of work, often to be met with in later life, at which the routine-trained are apt to fail ; it gives a welcome change at one period

of the day from continual mental transitions, out of one subject and into another, which carried on all day long are somewhat nerve-fretting when the best has been said in favour of change of occupation ; and it helps further in training the child's sense of time-perspective.

These are but two reflections among a multitude that may suggest themselves to the student of Comenius. Of his guiding ideals we may say that one was the reconciliation of the rising conflict of his time—it is not yet fully composed—between teaching through words and teaching through things ; and that another was the development through education of an inclusive outlook not only, as it were, in space, but in time, so as to train up minds and spirits that would be sensitive and responsive to the present, but would not live in the present alone. We shall be able to trace a partial, but only a partial influence upon educational thought, contemporary and subsequent, of this reformer, whose “ unfailing aspirations,” as Raumer said, “ lifted up in a large part of Europe many good men prostrated by the terrors of the times, and inspired them with the hope that by pious and wise systems of education there might be reared up a race of men more pleasing to God.” The Europe of our own day is not without its need of such an influence.

V

MILTON AND CASTE EDUCATION

ALTHOUGH the root ideals of Comenius's system never penetrated very deeply into the educational thought of Europe, seeds of his wide scattering at least sprang up and grew, if into systems that appear meagre and stunted compared with his original conception. His effect upon his age, as is often the case with the prophets of great truths, was rather the effect of his personality than of his gospel. One great reason for the extent of his influence was his intellectual humility, and his readiness not only to respond to the ideals of others, his contemporaries or immediate predecessors in educational reform, such as Andrea, Alstead, and Ratke, but to express a generous over-estimate of his debt to them. This attitude of mind has an attraction all its own. Comenius was essentially a learner-critic of the education of his times, and the platitude that any teacher must be continuously a learner if his teaching is to have vitality and appeal extends itself equally to the work of the propagandist. The educational reformer who sets a ring fence round his system has made the first provision for its decay.

The European reputation of Comenius was largely the personal reputation of a master filled with a childlike eagerness to give of his riches. Probably English education owes more than can easily be realized to the seeds that he dropped upon a soil hastily and none too deeply tilled during a brief lull in the strife of King and Parliament—a time of many interwoven strains and stresses, little suited to the calm working out of educational schemes. It may be interesting to trace his probable influence upon one great English mind of this time, that of Milton, as the giant of Puritan poetry appears during his brief and not wholly dignified excursion into the educational field. This special case is the more useful as an illustration because Milton appears to have been, or to have become, not only immune but somewhat hostile to the effect of Comenius's personality, and to have been influenced almost against his will by Comenius's ideas. A first glance at the facts would suggest the unedifying spectacle of a great man yielding to envy of another's greatness, though in another field. Milton undoubtedly was in close touch, for a time, with the ideals of the great educator, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that he borrowed as much of the Comenian system as appealed to his fancy or to his comprehension of educational needs, and then put the source of his inspiration out of his mind. But we shall see a likelihood that his excuse was something better than mere jealousy, or than a simple wish to play the

leading part himself upon the English educational stage.

In 1641 Comenius came to England, a Parliamentary invitation having apparently been extended to him at the instance of Hartlib, a Polish friend of Milton's, and an educational enthusiast. Within a year Parliament had a scheme in hand for "a college with revenues," we may presume on the Comenian model; but the times were too troublous for its fulfilment, and shortly afterwards the threat of renewed civil war drove Comenius to less congenial work in Sweden, where his methodology was esteemed, but his pansophic ideal viewed askance. It may be that if he had remained in England the dedication of Milton's *Tractate of Education* would have borne his name instead of Hartlib's, for we may imagine that as a runaway he fell somewhat in Milton's austere estimation; though it is hard to blame him, after losing his all in earlier years—not only his material all, but those near and dear to him—in the sack of Fulnek by the Spaniards, for a certain lack of enthusiasm about other people's wars. But Milton was never the man to forgive any apparent slight to his politico-religious principles; and the supposition that he was offended, though based upon mere conjecture, perhaps best explains (and most charitably) his patent desire to withhold credit from Comenius. "To search what many modern 'Janua's' and 'Didactics,' more than ever I shall read, have projected, my inclination leads

me not." Whatever the motive of this rather ungenerous declaration, it draws down the inevitable comment that the *Tractate* might have been a very much sounder and better-knit essay if Milton had given a modicum of attention to the works of Comenius which he thus decries, especially to *The Great Didactic*. The *Tractate* represents what immediately survived of the Comenian tradition whether Milton liked it or not, and whether or not he was conscious of its influence upon his own work. It draws us into a very narrow circle after the breadth and far-sightedness of Comenius; from the strictly educational point of view Milton is by far the lesser man, and he claims the appropriate privilege of taking his stand as the practical person. "Brief I shall endeavour to be; for that which I have to say, assuredly this nation hath extreme need should be done rather than spoken."

Certainly "this nation" was in a parlous state educationally, if we are to judge by the vigour with which Milton lays about him. "Grammatical flats and shallows"; "ragged notions and babblements"; and then, with the true leonine tail-lash, "we hale and drag our choicest and hopefulest wits to that asinine feast of sow-thistles and brambles which is commonly set before them as all the food and entertainment of their tenderest and most docible age." But it is only for these "choicest and hopefulest wits" that he proposes to cater, as drawn from "our noble and gentle youth"; a long

drop from the Comenian level, where no exclusion of class or sex was thought of. Milton's system aims at the education of a governing class; his entire view of education is based upon the oligarchic ideal, as indeed our own prevalent views still are. He is among those who have thought that one dominant class would, as a whole, be both willing and able to arrange for the best the affairs of a whole people. He would educate the few; Comenius would educate everyone, on the same principle by which he would "teach everything." Milton is exclusive, Comenius inclusive. "In this respect," says Masson, "the passions and the projects of Comenius were a world wider than Milton's." Further, Milton has only partially digested the universalism of Comenius; at twenty-three or so his pupils are to be sent travelling, "not to learn principles but to enlarge experience"—as though the two factors could be separated! Similarly, it is only when pupils have become "fraught with an universal insight into things" (a sufficiently Comenian touch) that they are to be trained as "able writers and composers in every excellent matter"; all through, artificial antitheses between principle, experience, and expression prevail.

It is easy to pick holes in the *Tractate*; but it is more profitable to trace the elements of realized synthetic method which it contains, and to observe that the seeds which Comenius sowed in England did not all shrivel upon the difficult soil of the time.

We find that a high place is given to sense training—the teacher is reproached for not “beginning with those Arts most easy (and those be such as are most obvious to the sense).” Some attention is given to methods that allow the emergence of individual types: “These ways would try all their peculiar gifts of nature; and, if there were any secret excellence among them, would fetch it out, and give it fair opportunities to advance itself by.” One phrase after another suggests synthesis of knowledge: “Any compendious method of Natural Philosophy”; “Geography, with a general compact of Physics,” and so forth. Ethics, formally considered, comes only after a thorough study of natural causation. As the next stage, “Being perfect in the knowledge of personal duty, they may then begin the study of Œconomics.” It will be noticed that we are here following the course of a Comenian sequence of subjects, somewhat imperfectly ordered. Last of all, with the study of “Law and legal justice” (a sound distinction!) comes Politics—“to know the beginning, end, and reason of political societies; that they” (the Miltonic pupils) “may not in a dangerous fit of the commonwealth be such poor, shaken, uncertain reeds, of such a tottering conscience as many of our great counselors have lately shewn themselves.” Here we see Milton displaying a characteristic of all believers in an oligarchic system—the tendency that naturally follows to criticise their oligarchs for failing to em-

body the will of the community instead of their own feeblar individual will. The inevitable condemnation which all oligarchs incur, even from their own side, is that they have failed to be democratic.

In his treatment of law and politics Milton's avowed debt to the Greeks is manifest; when it comes to his profession that he is indebted to the Greeks alone we may be pardoned for a little scepticism. We might guess that Hartlib still tried to uphold the Comenian view before him, and that he took refuge in claiming that he could get it all out of Plato and Aristotle. Even in so far as he could, it was largely Comenius who had kindled him to the enterprise. We have dwelt at some length upon the position of Milton as a partial pioneer in educational thought, not for its intrinsic importance—the *Tractate* is a far from representative by-product of his genius—but because by realizing the step downward, in the region of educational ideals, from Comenius even to such a mind as Milton's, we obtain some measure of the gulf above which Comenius towered, a gulf that is not yet filled. Milton in his turn was to be set among the educational prophets; and Richard Wynne, long afterwards, in dedicating to George III his anthology of "Essays on Education by Milton, Locke, and the Editors of the *Spectator*, &c.," hopes that "the noble efforts of those great geniuses mentioned above . . . may bring about a more general reformation in our method of educating the British youth."

Our method of educating the British youth has two distinct aspects, so artificially distinct that they have to be considered separately when we ask ourselves what we are about in our attempts to equip new generations with the means for surpassing the old. (The anti-educational view that "what was good enough for me is good enough for my children" is fortunately growing so rare that it can be left out of account.) Our State is a mixture of oligarchy—in its turn a mixture of aristocracy, plutocracy, and bureaucracy—with a small proportion of democracy. Our education, in so far as it has any relation to our polity, in part reflects traditional ideas of a governing class and a governed mass, and in part represents, very hazily, the supposition that we are a self-governing people in a sense other than that in which all peoples are ultimately self-governing, since fear of revolt keeps even the most self-willed autocrat in some degree under popular control. It is only comparatively true that the training in our public schools is aristocratic and the training in our State schools democratic. The modern public school has many of the characteristic virtues and faults of a partial democracy; and the elementary school is at least potentially open to be made the training-ground of an almost German docility. But it is true in the absolute sense that two tendencies pervade our system which are implacably at war with one another, the one encouraging class-separation, the other class-fusion. The conflict is, in

education, mainly subterranean ; but everyone is aware that it goes on continuously. Nearly every teacher is at heart a propagandist on the one side or the other.

It is convenient to raise this question in connection with the contrast between Milton and Comenius, because this contrast is well drummed into every student of educational history, and the sequence from Milton and Locke to the public school is well recognized as a fact to be set in opposition to the sequence from Comenius to Froebel and the reformed elementary school ; but it is of course a problem of all the ages that we are considering. And it is a problem for which there appears at first sight to be no solution. Reduced to its elements of the two desires, native, apparently, and ineradicable, in two types of the human mind—the desire to create or maintain a superior class, and the desire to set or to keep the classes upon an equal footing—the conflict is simply a fact of human natural history. And when two aims are seen to have been both vigorously and idealistically pursued throughout the vicissitudes of history, the strong presumption is that they are both right aims. Is political education, then, always to be an underground civil war, always to be kept underground for fear its conscious emergence should mean open war ? It can scarcely be emphasized too strongly that however well the subject of civics may be taught in the future—it has been all too little taught in the past—

the subject of modern politics, a great subject, whatever may be thought of modern politicians, can never be honestly and broadmindedly taught at all so long as an unavowed warfare is in progress between a principle that aims at the differentiation of classes and a principle that aims at their integration.

But if this reduction of the two warring principles to their simplest terms is sound—if the one is a desire for class-diversity, and the other a desire for class-unity—the quarrel disappears. The two principles coalesce into the one principle of unity in diversity which we know to be at the root of all biological, sociological and educational advance. Conflict between the ideal of unity and the ideal of diversity is simply a blind breaking-up of the partnership upon which the progress of all life depends.

The difficulty is that the quarrel cannot be regarded wholly in these terms. Superadded to the idea of class-differentiation is the idea that the most highly differentiated classes have an intrinsic right to dominate the rest. Qualifying the splendid hope of solidarity among classes is a fear which identifies differentiation with dominance, and thus is led to seek a dead level and to call this democracy. But surely we can assert with truth that both the idea of class-dominance and the idea of a necessary levelling-down in the scale of effective being are false guides. What we need is the mutual understanding between classes that would result from a realization of their complete dependence upon one

another, and would lead to a general levelling-up of opportunity and to the disappearance of status.

Considered in terms of this most desirable fellowship between the members of our body politic, the universalism of Comenius is far above the conflict. Indeed, its only fault lies in being too far above it for practical peacemaking ; and in this we may see perhaps the principal reason why the Comenian ideal has to wait so unconscionable a time for realization. Universalism has yet to be completely re-valued so that the inestimable benefit of mutual understanding that it has to offer may be made obvious in its practical aspects, though we shall see that something has been done by successors of Comenius to make its value easier to realize. The true essence of universalism escaped Milton almost entirely ; but there would be justice in the claim that Milton helped to keep alive a qualified universalism in a corner of our national consciousness.

Educational ideals are shown to be permanent by two tests ; whether they survive and exercise a cumulative influence for good, and whether they possess what evolutionists call " survival value," reappearing, like suppressed characters in a species, as soon as a suitable environment is regained. Milton, as educationist, stands midway between the two criteria ; for Wynne, and in no small degree for the schools of to-day, he is the " great genius," the farther column of an arch whose nearer column we have yet to perfect, in the public schools ; but he

is overspanned by the greater arch of the Comenian tradition, for whose nearer column a secure base has begun to be laid in our elementary schools. Meanwhile it is to the best product of the Miltonic type of training, the more broadminded variety of university scholar, that we now look for aid when we plan for the further realization of Comenian ideals ; and it is out of broad scholarship of this type that there arose the ideal of education for the pursuit of truth, which we have next to consider under the guidance of John Locke.

VI

LOCKE AND THE QUEST OF TRUTH

A DESIRE to impart information is, perhaps, the commonest and the least valuable of the motives that go to make a teacher. A desire to communicate true and sound methods of thought is not so common, and is of immensely greater value. The inspiration to put the means and the material of thought within the mental reach of the young, trusting the natural bent of youth towards inquiry, imposing the right minimum of direction, and even of guidance, and so developing and training intellectual initiative as well as mental facility, is as inestimable in a teacher as it is rare. The system of education outlined by John Locke swings between the two latter impulses. By tradition an upholder of instruction in the paths of truth, he was by nature a devotee of that truth towards which no mind can win unless by its own persistent efforts. Certain confusions follow ; Locke the instructor is not wholly consistent with Locke the seeker, and the inconsistencies are sufficiently obvious ; but, discounting these, a resultant compromise remains,

admirable in many ways, and typical of much that is best among English educational ideals.

It may have been a negative effect of his tradition, a fruit of the reaction from Calvinism and predestination, that prevented Locke from becoming a whole-hearted exponent of education as the encouragement of organic growth. As Professor Adamson has observed, his notion of the young mind as a "*tabula rasa*, written upon by experience only," affects his scheme fundamentally. We can well imagine that he hankered after a *tabula rasa* when the alternative was a *tabula inscripta* and the writing that of the grim followers of Calvin. Calvinism wrote in the book of every child's character that he was already foredoomed ; the reaction from Calvinism rubbed the terrible message out again, but only with the idea of leaving the page blank for the instructor's use. The notion of characters not to be set down in teacher's copperplate, but to be traced with slowly increasing certainty and clearness by childish hands, had not yet come into its own. To change the metaphor for that of Comenius, the garden of the child's mind was wrongly regarded as virgin soil, to be sown by the teacher in accordance with a formal pattern. The teacher of to-day has less excuse for desiring, or assuming that he has been given, a blank page upon which he may write what seems good to him, or a soil that he may sow as he pleases. But our prevailing practice is still overarched by Comenius, with his conception of " seeds of learn-

ing"—lying unfertilized, perhaps, but none the less distinctively individual, within the youthful brain—which education has “to bring to perfection”—to their own perfection, not merely to conformity with a preconceived pattern. Locke was well enough aware that truth can only germinate anew in the originative, not in the passively recipient mind. His life shows his trust in the innate germinal wisdom; and though his educational scheme is explicitly laid down upon formalist lines, his formalism is pleasingly contradicted at every turn by his reliance upon the desire of the young to create their own understanding. Many of us, especially in the public schools, might do well to take on from the hands of Locke that modicum of the Comenian ideal which he inherited.

Like ourselves, Locke could see his way more clearly towards education by organic development when he had the training of young children in mind. And to this ideal he added a thought that is the natural outcome of his own struggle for intellectual liberty. Children, he says, “have as much a mind to show that they are free; that their good actions come from themselves . . . as any of the proudest of you grown men. . . .” Further, “children are much less apt to be idle than men”; but “this is visible, that it is a pain to children to keep their thoughts steady to anything.” Here his desire to inscribe the first principles of truth upon the young mind meets with a primary, natural check.

He finds his way round the obstacle by the path that was rediscovered later by the educational psychologists. "I have always had a fancy that learning might be made a play and recreation to children ; and that they might be brought to desire to be taught, if it were proposed to them as a thing of honour, credit, delight, and recreation. . . ." "I have therefore thought that if playthings were fitted to this purpose, as they are usually to none. . . ." From this it is not so far a cry to the methods of Froebel. Locke adds the one perennial precept of the good educator : "Keep the mind in an easy, calm temper. . . . It is as impossible to draw fair and regular characters on a trembling mind as on a shaking paper."

The foregoing quotations point clearly enough to a confusion that even Locke's orderly mind was not able in his generation to escape ; the old confusion that makes for strife between education and instruction, in the strictly derivative sense of both terms. It comes to this, that he wants the children's minds set free and developed along the lines of their natural activities, in order that the teacher may be able to write upon them that which he sees fit to write. This, as a thesis, seems contradictory enough, but the contradiction is more apparent than real. It is due to the isolation of two extremes—extremes that centre in the individual and the social conceptions of life—omitting all the correlative, resolvent factors. Freedom and natural activity are very

obviously necessary to the development of all human values ; they are the contribution of the individual to the society. The teaching of tradition—of the realized truth of the past, with its corollary of control over the present—is equally necessary ; it is the contribution of the society, passed on by the educational system, to the development of the individual. Any conflict between individual liberty and societal tradition must needs be an artificial conflict at bottom. It is, indeed, only another form of that conflict between the principles of unity and of diversity which was considered, in its political aspect, in our last chapter. The ideal of individual liberty is a diversity-ideal ; the ideal of a tradition of social control is a unity-ideal. Education, in the strict sense of “ drawing out ” that which is in the individual child, is a process that favours individualism. Instruction, in the strict sense of “ building into ” the child that which the society sees as truth, is a process of social guidance, though it is true that the best instruction is self-instruction, and that the surest guidance is found through methods which make the child himself the rediscoverer of social values. To advocate either process in opposition to the other is the extreme of educational folly.

Locke's essential wisdom, the wisdom of a great philosopher and seeker for truth, is manifest in that he braves even contradictions in his instinctive insistence upon both processes. An unsolved con-

tradition is the *bête noire* of the professed reasoner, and Locke's mind was essentially logical ; but his love of the truth appears to have overcome his hatred of a contradiction when his instinct perceived that both individual liberty and social control were vital aspects of educational verity. Contradictory or not, the two aspects had to be brought into his system ; and it is precisely as a contradictory system that it has value. It asks a question ; it poses us with a paradox ; it demands a further solution. What is the right issue of the struggle between individual freedom and social constraint ? We have learned, by now, to answer the question with a formula : Social liberty is the further ideal. But it is one thing to have stated the ideal, and another to realize it. and meanwhile freedom and fellowship are still at war. Education still wonders how to combine the two within a unified doctrine. The resolvent factors that would bring them into union have yet to be completely worked out. Some of these factors we shall be able to trace in the work of later educators ; but it may be said at once that the educational problem of the relation between processes of drawing out and building in will be fully solved only in connection with the wider problem of individual freedom in relation to social life. In considering, in the next chapter, the strange influence of Rousseau upon European thought and feeling, we shall come into closer touch with this problem, if not with its solution.

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Meanwhile we have to take into account not only the individual freedom of mind and spirit that Locke had so greatly desired for himself, and now, having attained it in large measure, could not fail to provide for, however confusedly, in his educational scheme, but also the primary ideal for the pursuit of which he felt such freedom to be essential. Towards what outlook is the liberated mind of the child to be turned, in the first instance? "The tutor . . . should acquaint him with the true state of the world; and dispose him to think no man better or worse, wiser or foolisher, than he really is." This to begin with; the final aim is foreshadowed in a letter to Bolde, his champion in matters ecclesiastical: "Believe it, my good friend, to love truth for truth's sake is the principal part of human perfection in this world and the seed-plot of all other virtues." Locke, indeed, lived to rationalize the great poetic statement of Chaucer:—

Hold the hye way, and lat thy gost thee lede,
And Trouthe shal delivere, hit is no drede.

This passion for philosophic truth, if it can scarcely be classed as a novel inspiration in educational thought, involves the raising to a very high power, throughout the educational equation, of one of its most important factors. To inspire a high intellectual sincerity is one, though only one, of the ultimate aims of education. The will to translate realized truth into practical morals, and the power

of the emotions, rightly exercised, to warm cold truth and morals with the irradiation of beauty, have also to be developed ; but both the moral and the æsthetic faculties are dependent upon a high sense of reality. We may consider that Locke gave to philosophic realism, even of the most exalted kind, too isolated a splendour, and that the fullest development of his educational scheme would lack something of rounded completeness ; but his specific regard for verity is not so common that the teacher can neglect its implications as Locke works them out.

The idea of education in intellectual sincerity leads naturally away from formalism in teaching. Sincerity is native to the open, not to the shut-in mind, and Locke's treatment of knowledge gives a continual impression of the opening of doors that formalists of all ages have been in unconscious conspiracy to keep tightly closed. He is no Comenius, being, indeed, less an educator than a thinker who turns aside to demand from education the reasonable minimum of open-mindedness that is necessary for clear thought. The outcome, in his sketch of method in teaching, is rather a backing-up of "modern" method in general from the standpoint of a scholar and a philosopher than any new synthesis ; but such support has a value all its own.

One of the greatest of reasoners, Locke may be expected to give due importance to training in logic and in power of statement. He does so ; but as an

iconoclast : " I have seldom or never observed anyone to get the skill of reasoning well, or speaking handsomely, by studying those rules which pretend to teach it." For style, he advocates training in oral composition, but it is not to be composition *in vacuo* : " Would you not think him a little cracked, who would require another to make an argument on a Moot Point who understands nothing of our laws ? " Our own too common abandonment of composition perhaps suggests that we have been " a little cracked " in that respect ; correlation between subjects set for composition and the mental material of other classes leads to no such confession of failure. In every case theory is made to reach down to the root facts upon which it is based. Natural philosophy must be based upon " rational experiments and observations " rather than upon " barely speculative systems." The reading of Latin authors is to be prefaced by a study of Roman history. A judicious use of translations is all to the good ; as for formal grammar of the parrot-learnt kind, " there is more stir a great deal made with it than there needs." Arithmetic, " the easiest and consequently the first form of abstract reasoning," is to be connected for concrete material with the facts and figures of geography. The teacher should " make the child comprehend (as much as may be) the usefulness " of what he is taught, " and let him see by what he has learned that he can do something which he could not do before." Those who see no

practicable transition stage between education in watertight compartments, as largely pursued in the public schools, and the unified, co-ordinated curriculum of the developed synthetic method, will at least have the quest of truth for justification if they go back to Locke for their preliminary hints.

VII

ROUSSEAU AND SOCIAL LIBERTY

A CERTAIN type of education, or mis-education, may be crudely compared with the preparation of the bottle-gourd for the simple domestic uses to which it is adapted by tropical villagers. The young gourd is made to grow into a predetermined shape by binding it where a constriction is wanted, or where a protuberance is to be allowed only a limited degree of expansion. The natural contents of the fruit are removed from within the rind by a gradual process of decomposition and erosion. The gourd is then made a receptacle for whatever it is required to hold, or it is left empty for an ornament.

In studying the ideals and schemes of the past it is well to remember that the kind of training for which the bottle-gourd's education furnishes an extreme symbol was always tending to establish itself at the instance of the stupid and shortsighted and with the acquiescence of the ignorant. True education has for long had to struggle against the dead weight of this tendency—to labour increasingly for the leavening of that inert lump of opinion which regards schooling only as machinery to pre-

pare the new generation for serving the dulled purposes of the old. The existence of the struggle and its slowly increasing success are our grounds of hopefulness for the education of the future. But for this we might wonder whether educational idealism were not after all a chimera, since educational practice has advanced so short a distance along the roads marked out for it by its greatest pioneers.

Jean Jacques Rousseau was brought up practically without education, and grew up a critic, but a critic without a criterion. Just as sound training in early youth might have enabled him to develop into a clean-living and an honourable man, so the experience of a real education would have given to his genius a pivot upon which to turn when he looked around upon the results of false education. Un-centred, he tended to become self-centred ; this is clear enough in respect of his personal life, but the observation carries us further when we apply it to his impersonal life—to the world of his social and humanitarian passions. The first question for the humanitarian is—What do you mean by humanity ? *L'humanité, c'est moi* would have been the truthful answer for Rousseau to give, and a very good answer, within limits—limits, however, which Rousseau consistently overstepped, in life and thought alike, for his ego reached to his horizon. It is the curse of Socialism (in the wide sense of that politically besmirched term) that so many of its exponents have thought first and last, in their heart

of hearts, of society's duty to themselves. Such was the outlook that Rousseau inevitably brought to bear upon education, as upon social theory as a whole ; the greater pity since he was the first, as Mr. Hudson has said, who "approached the whole question of education from the point of view of social theory."

Free himself in a sense, though tragically unfitted to use freedom, Rousseau saw the world around him in bonds and fetters ; whether with true vision or not we may judge by the extraordinary spread of his influence. In the matter of education he saw all the child-training of his time as a process akin to the gourd-bottle manufacture of our metaphor ; whether his view was distorted or not, it induced in him a reaction that opened his eyes to a fundamental truth. Once and for all he threw aside the notion of a child's nature as a shell to be moulded, hollowed out and filled ; natural growth, rightly conditioned, was the only education. It is true that this realization had impressed itself in greater or less degree upon his predecessors, but he was the first to make of it an absolute, not a relative doctrine ; and it is upon absolutes that great ideals are based. Practice is another matter. To educate solely by the encouragement of natural growth we must have a system of educational technique completely fitted to that end, and of such a technique Rousseau had only the very vaguest inklings. We shall have to trace in succeeding chapters the later development,

in other and more capable hands, of the methodology that he lacked ; but the technique of education through freedom is in its infancy even yet, and, appropriately enough, has scarcely been applied as yet to the training of any but the youngest children. Still, it was Rousseau's absolute, uncompromising statement of the crude ideal and its wide acceptance, even in all its crudity, that gave impetus to the devising of method ; and to-day, so far as training of the gourd-bottle type still persists, it is more and more on sufferance only, a makeshift awaiting its own gradual supersession.

Many critics appear to have found it extremely difficult to read Rousseau without losing their tempers with him. There is every reason for annoyance when a man of genius combines an unassailable principle with an unjustifiable way of life ; but the spirit of annoyance is apt to reject the sound principle together with its unsound application. Every actual life is partly justified and partly condemned when it is brought under the scrutiny of ideals ; and Rousseau's way of life, in the main unjustifiable as the manifestation of a monstrous egoism, finds its partial justification in the ideal of liberty for the individual ego. Needless to say, this is an entirely sound ideal ; and like other single ideals it can be realized only in conjunction with others. It is often maintained, in a common looseness of language, that " too much liberty " is bad for a child, or for anyone. But there is no such thing as too much liberty. There

is liberty, and there is constraint ; and everyone knows that in the abstract liberty is the better of the two. The practical trouble arises when there is no answer, or the wrong answer, to the question, " What do you want your liberty for ? What would you be free to do, or think, or feel ? " This is where further ideals must come in, without which we have, not " too much liberty," but an imitation that is not liberty at all. It is these further ideals which education for liberty has to teach. These ideals Rousseau lacked, and in that blindness he wrote of liberty as though it were the only ideal in the world.

None the less he had an inborn sense of the beauty of freedom in itself which even the misery of his own misuse of freedom could not destroy. The reader of Rousseau who comes to the appalling fact that the apostle of education in freedom left his own children to the tender mercies of a public orphanage is apt to throw down the book in disgust, saying that here is the outcome of Rousseau's freedom-ideal—a refusal to be bothered with the upbringing of his own children. But it is more true to say that he was not free enough. He was not free to delight in the bringing-up of a family. He himself attributes the fact to the enslaved social order of his times ; we can see that it was also his own fault, in that he failed to practise the liberty which he preached—the liberty of fatherhood to bring up the young in freedom. Our moral reprobation must not attack

his ideal, but the selfishness, idleness, and ignorance that prevented his applying it.

Ignorant liberty is no liberty at all ; education has to perfect it by giving knowledge. Idle liberty is no liberty at all ; education has to turn it into liberty of action by training and developing the natural human desire for fruitful activity. Selfish liberty is liberty shackled by the bonds of self—a contradiction in terms. Rousseau himself knew well enough, in theory, that true liberty is selfless ; that in its essence it depends not upon the individual in himself but upon the relation between the individual and the society. True liberty is social. The opposite view that a man is nowhere so free as upon a desert island exactly misinterprets the nature of freedom. Robinson Crusoe was not free to exercise, except in prospective or retrospective thought, any of the social faculties which are man's highest means of self-expression. If such deprivation of faculties is freedom, the ultimate liberty would be complete annihilation.

Rousseau perceived that liberty is social ; but, as we have seen, he only perceived one way of reform : society must give freedom to the individual. It is equally true that individuals must give freedom to society. Liberation can only be effected by a society that knows what liberty is ; and such a society can only be built up of individuals who have won their freedom, and transfused their sense of it into the veins of the community. It is here that the

part which education has to play becomes apparent. Rousseau only saw that education, the message of the older generation to the younger, must be a message of liberation. He failed to recognize that education must also teach the further ideals for whose realization liberty is to be used, and so train up individuals who, experiencing true liberty in themselves as a right relation with the community, will pass their experience into the common stock by giving freedom as well as demanding it.

Two factors are essential in the realization of an ideal ; the ideal itself, and the actualities of the world in which it has to make good its position. We must turn to the successors of Rousseau to see the ideal of education in freedom brought into any relation with actuality. Rousseau stands almost solely for the ideal itself, and, as has been suggested, for only half the ideal at that. Trained in another and a better phase of Europe's history, he might have given to Europe a wider and a wiser message. Pre-revolutionary France turned a potential philosopher into a fanatical idealist. Others had to interpret the ideal which he saw with such piercing if partial vision ; and the bloodstained crudity of the interpretation, in the French Revolution, bears witness to the lack of any philosophy of freedom to which an appeal for reason could have been made. Even now, when we are in the midst of a war of liberation, and more has been said and written in two years about the philosophy of freedom than in two

centuries, perhaps, before, a reverberation of the old horror of anarchy still sounds in English ears, and something in us still shrinks from the path of liberty as though it were the way of destruction. In our dealings with children, especially, we have to unlearn an irrational mistrust of freedom, and to rediscover that in his essential position Rousseau was right : education can either liberate or it can warp the self-developing nature of the child. It cannot make citizens ; it can spoil them, or it can endue them with the power to make themselves.

A sporadic modern tendency to give children a freedom as blind and purposeless, as uneducated, as Rousseau's own, shows our reaction from mistrust of liberty, and the mistrustful often quote the unruly modern child as an instance of the dangers of "too much freedom." He is, on the contrary, an instance of incomplete freedom. Uneducated liberty has nothing to work upon, and, so far, is not free but enslaved to self. The fact that we still have little trace of a system of education for liberty is due to the mistrustful themselves. They retard the very ideal whose imperfection they decry.

We must not lose sight of the truth, however, that liberty is one of the ultimate ideals, and therefore not a thing to be snatched at in a hurry. Absolute liberty can come only with absolute perfection ; and we win relative liberty only as fast as we can teach ourselves to use it. Meanwhile constraint has its lesser, temporary value as an expedient,

wherever freedom remains still untaught, even as fear of the pains of evil is necessary to us till we learn to love the joys of good. But constraint is subject to the same law of fellowship that applies, as we have seen, to liberty.

We have suggested in an earlier chapter that the contrast between training by means of free development and training through constraint is naturally associated with the contrast between the individual and the social aspects of life. In so far as constraint is necessary, it is necessary, or justifiable, only when it is social constraint. Nursery rules, or school rules, are the rules of a small society, and the keeping of them is a preparation for keeping the rules of a larger society. But every rational mother or teacher, like every openminded statesman or judge, recognizes rules as makeshifts. There is nothing ultimate about them; justice demands their relaxation or suspension in accordance with circumstances, and their only criterion is the highest expediency. This is not the less, but the greater, reason for loyalty to law. If we disregard an ultimate, it remains in spite of us; if we break a sound convention, we destroy a link in the chainwork of social solidarity. But for Rousseau the chainwork was evil, not made up of living links, but of cold metal forged upon the limbs of the unconsenting many by the powerful few. Thus law ceased, for him, to be a social expression, and constraint became a function of unsocial tyranny. Can we not argue that, as in pre-

revolutionary France, so in the Europe that will have to be reconstructed after the Great War, constraint is a factor in civilized life which it should be our constant, deliberate effort to supersede? To supersede, not to abolish without replacement, for that way lies anarchy.

If so education, as Rousseau dimly saw, has the principal part to play in clearing the road for social liberty—that true and only liberty in which the individual and the society are at one, and constraint gives place to consent. Merely to state such an ideal is to demonstrate its Utopian quality. But there is nothing wrong with an Utopian ideal if it is a true one ; indeed, all great ideals are Utopian. The only error is to leave out any of the slow, necessary steps by which alone they can gradually be approached. Rousseau left out nearly all the steps, and his plan for a boy's education leaves the reader with the uncomfortable conviction that Emile would in the end have fallen into most of the pitfalls that entrapped his creator. It was left for Pestalozzi to begin the building of a safe causeway from the actual towards the ideal and, indeed, to start his building from the very bedrock of stern actuality.

VIII

PESTALOZZI'S WORK

SPARKS from the smoky fire of Rousseau's genius fell in many directions, sometimes with illuminating, sometimes with incendiary effect. The young Pestalozzi appears to have caught the clearer gleam ; for, although we learn from Henning that in his early zeal on behalf of the poor and the oppressed he came near to justifying assassination in the cause of reform, we know from his own words that he turned readily to the more excellent way, the way of education, on reading *Emile* :—

The home as well as the public education of the whole world, and of all ranks of society, appeared to me altogether as a crippled thing, which was to find a universal remedy for its present pitiful condition in Rousseau's lofty ideas. The ideal system of liberty, also, to which Rousseau imparted fresh animation, increased in me the visionary desire for a more extended sphere of activity, in which I might promote the welfare and the happiness of the people.

Here we have again, in youthful phrase, the wider ideal of Comenius, the greater outlook upon education as the service of humanity, not merely as that culture of a superior caste which sufficed for the educational idealism of Milton and Locke.

The service of humanity at large offers a dangerous and an ill-rewarded career—ill-rewarded, if we reckon its reward in terms of material prosperity ; and Pestalozzi had not only, like Comenius, many vicissitudes to endure, but also much contempt and misunderstanding to overcome. Perhaps the highest testimonial to his character and to the quality and permanence of his enthusiasm is to be found in the effect upon him of his greatest apparent failure. In the farm school which he started at Neuhof he took advantage of the local custom of handing over waifs and orphans to the agricultural peasantry—often to be wretchedly exploited as drudges or even as beggars—to attempt the building up of a model school with these poor castaways for its human material. Judged by the standard of human values, the experiment was a great vindication of his principles ; but it was not, as it was intended to be, self-supporting (largely, it is true, because of Pestalozzi's innate incapacity for business management) ; his children were decoyed from him as his efforts raised them from their helpless squalor to the wage-earning level ; subscriptions that buoyed up the work for a time eventually fell off ; and the end was ignominious collapse. But writing, in later

years, of this time he could say : " In the struggle in which this attempt involved me I had learned a vast deal of truth, and I was never more fully convinced of the importance of my views and plans than at the moment when they seemed to be for ever set at rest by total failure." " There was no 'total failure' in the matter," comments Mr. Holman, in his illuminating account of Pestalozzi's life and work, " for over a hundred children had been rescued from ignorance and poverty and degradation." There was the inner certainty of a success greater than the failure, a success upon which his later and completer work was ultimately founded.

Unlike Rousseau, Pestalozzi had had as the basis of his nurture the inestimable groundwork of a mother's understanding care ; and it was upon this foundation that he fell back for the expression of his educational ideal during the years of poverty and contempt that ensued. *Leonard and Gertrude*, a naively beautiful story of the spread of a single mother's influence over a whole community, brought to him, as to the Gertrude of his book, a wider fame than he had dreamed of attaining. Its contemporary effect was comparable with that of *Emile*, and though the hope of its sub-title, " A Book for the People," was hardly realized in the sense that its educational import was generally understood, it still led to real popular benefit by turning the minds of educated social thinkers and workers towards fruitful fields of educational practice. The great

principle which emerges in the Bonnal school of Pestalozzi's imagining—a school that grows naturally, in the story, out of such needs as he had realized day by day among his neighbours and companions in poverty—is that popular education must take the life of the people where it finds it, and in awakening and developing the minds of children must keep them in touch with the domestic realities among which they are growing up, and in whose eventual reform their training is to make its social value manifest. This principle has an equal claim to recognition in our own day, whatever the improvement, materially, in the condition of our masses as compared with that of the Neuhof peasants in 1780. There is sound criticism lurking inarticulate behind the old-fashioned Philistine objection to “all this Board School, piano-playing nonsense.” It is of no use to whirl the child, bewildered if delighted, through half-comprehended realms of knowledge, mental activity, and enlightenment, only to drop him back at the end of it all into the old drab, aimless, unexplained environment, critical, disillusioned perhaps, but with no idea in his mind of what it needs for betterment. This is worse than useless, it is cruel; even worse than cruel, it is stupid, with a stupidity that bears harsh fruit in the blind revolts and treacheries that come of an inarticulate discontent. Our elementary education has perhaps begun to learn that it must take heed of and walk hand in hand with the daily life of the

people, and that the vistas it opens up, to have any reality, must be visible from the kitchen fireside at home ; but the lesson is very far indeed from being taken completely to heart. No syllabus should fail to prescribe the connection of school interests with home facts, and the systematic explanation of local conditions, local affairs, local hopes and prospects, in relation to the more general ideas and ideals that are gradually being fostered in the modern elementary school. Nor are our public schools, except in so far as the infrequent social wisdom of individual teachers can operate, any too ready to equip the coming masters of the social complex with mental connections between general theory and present reality.

The author of *Leonard and Gertrude*, now well established in reputation, was able to offer his services as an educator to the enthusiasts of the Helvetic Republic with certainty of acceptance. The concluding phase, long and fruitful, of his life-work, in the schools of Stanz, Burgdorf, and Yverdun, was in effect the resumption and extension of his earlier labour of love at Neuhof, successful now in every sense, despite recurrent difficulties due to what he himself described as "my unrivalled incapacity to govern." The detail of the methodology that he developed in these schools repays careful study by modern teachers ; but we are more concerned for our present purpose with the few broad principles upon which it was based. These cannot

be better indicated than in Pestalozzi's own words : " Try, first, to broaden your children's sympathies, and, through satisfying their daily needs, to bring love and kindness into such unceasing association with their impressions and activity that these sentiments may be engrafted in their hearts." A perennial precept this, easier to utter than to carry out ; but the student of Pestalozzi's work knows with what richness of devotion it was carried out. " The further development of those feelings requires the highest art of education. . . . Here you must not trust to nature ; you must do all that is in your power to supply the place of her henceforth blind guidance, by the wisdom of experience." In this the disciple of Rousseau transcends the pure naturalism of his earlier master ; transcends, for the method must lose nothing of naturalism while combining with it the teaching of experience and authority :—

Man readily accepts what is good, and the child willingly listens to it ; but it is not for your sake that he desires it, master and educator, but for his own. The good to which you wish to direct him must not depend upon your varying moods and temper ; it must be a good which is good in itself and in the nature of things, and which the child can recognize, for itself, as good.

Here we have the true reconciliation between freedom and authority in educational method, at

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any rate as regards the relation between the teacher and the individual child. This is not of course the only relation that appears in school work, and it remained for Froebel to think out the position of the teacher as interpreter of a social authority ; but it is the relation that has first to be taken into account. A teacher's authority either disappears or becomes blindly coercive unless its relation to the will of the individual child, including the child's will to freedom, is of the right kind.

The relation between teacher and child is wrong if the child does and learns and thinks what he is told for the teacher's sake, not for his own ; this is the first point of Pestalozzi's statement. It is quite as wrong in its consequences, though less obviously so in the actual process of teaching, if the teacher's constraining will is exercised not through force or threat of force but through a talent for persuasiveness—that "strong personality" which is often supposed to be an essential part of the teacher's equipment. To hear many people talk, one would imagine that only those endowed with a magnetic personality should be allowed to teach at all : a ruling which, if carried into effect, would reduce the numbers of the teaching profession seriously. Almost the exact opposite is the case. Education is not a hypnotic process ; and people of a compelling personality do as much harm as good by their teaching unless they know how to keep personal influences very much in the background. Otherwise they

teach children not to desire knowledge and wisdom, but to please people whom it is an easy delight to please—and to take little trouble to please anyone else. The children are learning, of course, incidentally, but they ought to be learning directly, not incidentally. Their incentive to learn, if it is to have any permanence, must be a developing desire for knowledge and wisdom, not the ulterior motive of pleasing a particular type of person ; for when they pass out of the region of this personal influence they have no enthusiasm in themselves, of their own creating, to carry them onward, and easily sink back into indifference.

What, then, is to be the teacher's authority over the child, if it is to operate neither by coercion nor by an irresistible persuasion that is a form of coercion quite as effective as force in providing children with a false and impermanent motive for doing as they ought ? Pestalozzi's view is that he must point the child to something that is " good in itself " : so obviously good that the child will wish for guidance and control to help him to reach it. It is always useful to ask oneself, over any difficulty in getting a child to obey, " To what goal have I pointed ? Towards what good am I telling him to reach out ? " Usually we find either that no good motive has been invoked or that the good to be reached through obedience has not been made comprehensible to the child. There are times, of course, when this good cannot be explained ; the issue is too complex, or

the case is one of emergency, or the morale of the class is involved ; but collapse of the teacher's authority at such times is precisely an indication that he has failed to explain the good when it could be explained, and so has failed to build up a trust in his authority as something that can be relied upon to point towards good.

This principle can be misused. In attempting to explain the good to a child in terms that he can understand, it is fatally easy to point to a shallow outside motive for doing a right action or working hard to learn an important lesson. This nearly always fails, because children have an almost infallible instinct for seeing through this kind of sophistry, though they may seldom be able to discomfit us by putting their sense of the falsity in a proffered motive into words. The good to which we point has to be the real, essential good of the action that the child is to do ; the importance of his lesson has to be its true importance, so far as he can understand these things. How are we to get it expressed ? Pestalozzi does not fail us in this very practical region. We must point to a good that is "in the nature of things." Children, with all their imaginativeness (perhaps because of it), are invincible realists, and the appeal to reality seldom fails. But this presupposes two conditions : that the child's teaching is being kept in close touch with reality, as was the teaching of Pestalozzi's pupils, and that the teacher is open-minded enough, uni-

versalist enough, to perceive what is "the nature of things" in relation to the child's problem. Some teachers have a delightful power of ready explanation along these lines, and it is often thought that they must be very clever and quick-witted; but the faculty is chiefly the fruit of effective practice. It is the Comenian education, or self-education, that leads to the natural discipline exercised by the disciple of Pestalozzi.

The good towards which we have to direct the steps of children, the good which the child can recognize for himself as good, must be a good of which the child can see the point; and the primary point is that which penetrates the child's sense of what is worth his while. But it is easy to adopt too low a standard for the good that a child will think worth his while. The acute, innate, childish sense that rejects an unreal motive for doing what the teacher wants done, also rejects the proffered good that is translated into terms which make it seem too easy of attainment. Some providence so directs our evolution that children are possessed of a very strong instinctive feeling that nothing is greatly worth while which does not cost an effort. Modern attempts at education in freedom are apt to withdraw coercive discipline without substituting the better alternative of self-discipline. Children are either disciplined, self-disciplined, or undisciplined and fundamentally unhappy; and the last state is worse than the first. Self-discipline is only pro-

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moted by pointing the child's way to a good that he can see to be difficult, though he must also see it to be not impossible. This is the method that enables the child to feel that he is doing something truly worth while.

For a final quotation we may choose a sentence which is a veritable foundation-stone in the building up of educational method, since without arousing the will to learn no teacher can do anything :—

Whatever (the child) does gladly, whatever brings him credit, whatever helps him to realize his greatest hopes, whatever rouses his powers and enables him to say with truth *I can*—these things he wills.

Such principles do not call for an easy lip-service, nor even alone for careful study of the practice by which Pestalozzi began to give them effect ; they call for an effort of constructive thought from the humblest teacher—and still more so from the less humble—that their application to the needs and circumstances of his own day may be worked out in every possible connection. Such was the way of Froebel, Pestalozzi's disciple, and his eventual successor as a light in the educational firmament, to whom our next chapter must be devoted.

IX

THE CREED OF FROEBEL

TO base an educational system upon a prior assumption is to invite misunderstanding of the most natural and inevitable kind from those whose prior assumptions are different. Such misunderstanding has been the lot of all great educators in the degree to which the *a priori* element has been fundamental to the logic of their systems—and no vital argument can avoid the *a priori* element altogether. The argument for universalism as Comenius understood it is rooted in the assumption that the widest possible knowledge of the universe is the province of education ; and those who assume that education is solely a mental gymnastic, for which a few “ subjects ” are more effectual than many, simply decline to follow an argument which would show that the ablest intellectual gymnast is quite capable of being and remaining an exceedingly ignorant person. Froebel’s educational argument was rooted in two assumptions which many people do not treat as fundamental : that “ the desire for unity is the basis of all genuinely human development and cultivation,” and that “ the child is the

chief agent in his own development." Acting upon the first assumption he carried to a further pitch of realization the "pansophic" ideal of Comenius; acting upon the second, he took on from the hands of Pestalozzi the task of realizing in practice the cloudy ideal of Rousseau. As the result of both inspirations he has left behind him a methodology that has been widely adopted with somewhat rare understanding of its full meaning and purpose.

Froebel's almost esoteric belief in unity was early applied to educational criticism. While he was teaching in a private school in Berlin to support himself during a period of attendance at lectures the lack of co-ordination in the system to which he was subject troubled him continually. "Everywhere," he says, "I sought for recognition of the quickening interconnection of parts, and for the exposition of the inner all-pervading rule of law"—and in vain. On taking the responsibilities of a private tutor at the age of twenty-five and trying to get his function clear in his own mind, he was depressed by "the utter absence of any organized connection between the subjects of education." A year later he took his three pupils to Pestalozzi's school at Yverdun, where he worked and studied for two years. "I passed a glorious time at Yverdun," he wrote later, "elevated in tone and critically decisive for my after life. At its close, however, I felt more clearly than ever the deficiency of inner unity and interdependence."

Pestalozzi's genius was of another order than the constructive. Froebel felt that "each separate branch of education was in such a condition as to interest powerfully but never wholly to content the observer, since it prepared only further division and separation." Diversity of interest was beginning to outstrip unity of treatment, as in the days of Comenius. This, as we have seen elsewhere, is a natural process. Diversity springs of its own accord from the ever-branching activities of man ; the educational unities have to be thought out in time to keep pace with it, and as very few people take the trouble to do this thinking, and these few meet with only a slow and a reluctant attention from the rest, unity is always apt to get behindhand, so that diversity becomes division and deadness. Such was the truth of which Froebel became aware ; and it came to him with the ring of a spiritual call. He became impelled to preach the gospel of unity, "with all the force both of my pen and of my life, in the shape of an educational system."

A genuinely synthetic method in education can only be constructed about a nucleus. The Hellenic synthesis was centred in an æsthetic ; the beautiful, in the widest sense, was its ultimate sanction. The synthesis of which Locke's system is a type was centred in the root desire of the human mind for truth. Our own system, in so far as we possess one, has been centred in a kind of highest common factor of prevailing morals, not going very far or very deep,

but pragmatically effective so far as it does extend. For an intellectual as distinct from this vaguely moralist centre we contend with one another in needless controversy between literature and science—the twin nuclei for any live interpretation of human existence. And the issue of this controversy is furthered narrowed by specialists: the writer has heard it cogently argued that geography is the only possible co-ordination centre for a sanely devised curriculum. Froebel's philosophy of education relates the whole question to a different region of practical thought. To his mind the first question for the educator was not "What shall we teach?" Comenius had long ago endeavoured "to search out and discover a rule in accordance with which teachers teach less and learners learn more," and had based his system upon the dictum "Children learn to do by doing." Froebel gave fuller content to the motto by changing it to "Children grow by doing." Activity is the only educative process, and all teaching must be judged by the extent to which it induces vital activity on the part of the child. From hour to hour the teacher needs to ask himself as he surveys his class, "Are they passive or active?" But this is only the beginning.

Froebel's further criterion was, first, the quality, and, second, the tendency of the child's activity. There is a manifest danger in centring educational values in the activity of the individual child. Such a basis is incalculably harmful if the child becomes

aware of it, as children do, and learns to regard his own little self-centred vortex of thoughts and feelings as the main thing that matters. The activity must be made social. "The Kindergarten," said Froebel, "is the free republic of childhood." But the social element implies social control, and he adds that, "If national order is to be recognized as a benefit in later years, children must first be accustomed to law and order, and therein find the means of freedom." And the teacher must be felt as the interpreter, not the arbitrary inventor, of the social law that reigns in the small community. "Between educator and pupil, between request and obedience, there should rule invisibly a third something to which educator and pupil are equally subject." We have seen in the last chapter that the "third something," between the educator and the pupil as two individuals, is the ultimate good towards which the teacher has to point the child's way. We have now a second aspect of the relation between teacher and child: that in which the child is a member of a fellowship, and the teacher a mouthpiece of the laws of fellowship. Fellowship itself is in this case the good which he invokes.

But fellowship is only a word till the beauty of its meaning has been realised in life. What is there in the child's own mind that we can appeal to, what principle which he will recognize as meriting obedience for its own sake? This "third something" might be partially defined as the child's community-

sense of what is best, a sense which no normal child, habituated to the quiet, simple appeal to his reason, fails to evince. We use such an appeal continually ; but, like the appeal to the ultimate good of the individual child, it is fatally easy to use in a wrong and shallow way, and a way that the child knows at the back of his mind to be wrong and shallow. The standard implied in the warning, " That sort of thing is not done," is a low standard ; it is purely negative, and we require positive standards. The appeal to reason that takes the form, " Think what it would be like if everybody did that ! " is better, especially when the " that " referred to is an obviously anti-social action ; but it still errs on the negative side. It is a good to be gained, not merely an evil to be avoided, that must be made the objective of the child's social sense. The positive feeling to be aroused is his natural instinct of helpfulness. The call of social duty can nearly always be translated into a call to " come and help "—a call that draws the child out of self-preoccupation into a recognition that others have need of him. But the need must be genuine, not trumped up for the occasion ; and this presupposes a school in which the activities of the children have been made genuinely social, as they are made by Froebel's system. Needless to say, there are headstrong moments when the quiet call to a child's immature social sense will not be effectual all at once. There are often moments for the teacher when the social

law must be, as Froebel says, "firmly and sternly emphasized," but these will be educationally valuable only in so far as their appeal for the child, in retrospect, is the appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober.

The social spontaneity that is the essence of real freedom is still only the means to Froebel's end, only the distinguishing quality of the free activity in which he so deeply believed. "Children grow by doing"; and, because of his belief that the character and direction of their growth could only be permanently conditioned by activity chosen and willed by themselves, he made their choice and will, at each of the successive stages of its active development, the true central nucleus around which his system crystallized. The right things to teach, at any stage, were the things that gave to free activity the greatest vitality and scope and the widest promise of further extension. The universalism of Comenius here finds its nucleus and its new justification in the demand of growing child-nature for a complete and a many-sided self-realization, and a self-realization within a social order. Merely to state such a criterion is to suggest an enormous potential range of subject-matter, but also to set a rational and a natural boundary to its presentation at any given moment. The Comenian precept was, in effect, "Teach everything"; and teachers not unnaturally quailed before the task. Froebel's emendation might be taken to read, "Teach everything through which your

child can fruitfully exercise and develop his own activity " ; and this makes the apparent demand upon the teacher far less exacting.

The real demand, however, goes deeper than many of Froebel's followers have realized. It is a demand not for universalized knowledge, but for universalized interest. To be the right leader for the enthusiastic activities of the ideal Froebel class the teacher must be the most keenly interested person present ; otherwise the keenest child in the class would be a better leader than he. This is not to say that his personality must provide a continual stimulus to enthusiasm. A great deal of valuable educational energy is wasted in the attempt to impose adult enthusiasms upon immature minds. The more disinterested in a sense, and in a sense the more detached the teacher is, the better. He has to show exactly the type of interest that he expects from the children, at a remove from their own that is within their comprehension and only just outside their reach ; and to show it he has to possess it. To realize in any degree Froebel's concept of the unity of knowledge he has to develop the habit of mind that seeks connections everywhere and refers everything to its simplest fundamentals ; this valuable and childlike faculty has very likely been educated out of him and will have to be studiously regained. But no method of regaining it is comparable with the daily endeavour to understand and to satisfy the mental needs of the young—especially their

fundamental need to reconstruct the universe for themselves.

The principles of Froebel do not apply only to the kindergarten, though it was in this elementary region of school work that his detailed practice was developed. No one can study his writings understandingly without realizing that he shows cause for a fundamental change from our prevailing outlook upon education. It is not a soft and an easy path that he opens up, as is sometimes supposed—either upon hearsay or from a study of some of his interpreters, who give only a nebulous idea of education along the line of least resistance. It is a way that demands steady thought and courageous self-discipline from teacher and pupil alike. Based upon originative activity, it requires the working of the creative human spirit for every step of advance. It does not allow of the easy but fallacious “progress” and “results” dear to the formalist and to the ignorant parent: progress in memorizing rule of thumb, and results in applying rule of thumb uncomprehendingly. Every step is a real step, upon which real will and thought and feeling have been expended. This is only an easy way in that it is an inspiring way, and because it is easier to work hard under a true inspiration than to shirk and shuffle over work that does not carry the heart with it.

We must consider in the next chapter the undoubted fact that Froebel's way is not everybody's way, and that a common and a highly valuable type

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of teacher can attain to Froebel's principles only by a path other than Froebel's. But the first thing to realize is what Froebel's way is and means. It is not a nursery game, preliminary to serious education ; it is education as serious and as real as any that has been conceived, and far more serious and real than any that is practised.

The mention of practice brings us to the question why Froebel's principles are not in common use outside the region of the kindergarten. The chief reason appears to be that extraordinary notion of practicality which declines to test any principle until someone else has tested it first. We are very prone to demand of a theorist that he shall show his theory in action before we will consent to examine it even as a theory ; and, when he does give us as complete an object-lesson as we will allow him to give (for we usually interfere at every stage), we make little effort to look beyond it or to seek in it any further significance than is upon the surface.

No one says to an architect, " Your house is only built on paper ; do be more practical ! Get your bricks and mortar and build the real thing, and then we will see whether we want it or not." Yet this is what we say, in effect, to the architect of an educational system ; and Comenius and Froebel set humbly to work and build with their own hands as much of the edifice as they can. The world then uses, or misuses, a small proportion of what they have actually built. This parallel overstates the

case against the world, because a building can be made safe by obeying known mechanical laws, while educational laws are less surely ascertained, and their discoverers are obliged continually to test them in practice ; but our fault is to look only at the practice and to let the law escape us—to say “Bricks ; and mortar ; yes, that is how he does it. It is much simpler than he pretends.” To use Froebel’s kindergarten bricks is not necessarily to build according to Froebel’s educational plans ; and even to adopt Froebel’s actual methods with full understanding of their meaning is far from being the whole duty of his successors. He planned a greater edifice than he or any other man could build alone ; of that greater edifice we are the artisans, and by far the greater part of the workmanship is for us to contrive after a careful study of his drawings.

We have attempted no detailed analysis of Froebel’s methodology ; for one thing, it is accessible in his own words and in those of many able interpreters and commentators ; for another, it was devised for his own time and people and is only partially applicable to ours. It sufficed to fill a Prussian Government with panic lest Prussian governors might find a free, self-determining generation upon their hands ; it was publicly suppressed ; and with more Machiavellian insight it has since been turned by Prussian Government to uses that Froebel would have loathed from the bottom of his soul. In any case, it is our

business to sit loose to methods while we keep firm hold upon tried principles ; the opposite tendency is the bane of education. Method, like law, is a matter of circumstance and expediency, vitally important for us to reinvent and readjust, not blindly to readopt. Imagine the adoption of Froebel's methodology, cut and dried, in our preparatory schools ! The recognition and application of Froebel's guiding principles would be a very different matter. But it is not all who are capable of learning to subscribe to Froebel's faith ; and for the doubters there is perhaps more to be learned by following the strictly logical pathway of Herbart's tracing.

X

HERBART AND THE EXACT METHOD

TEACHERS fall under a rough natural classification that divides those who work rather through rule than through sympathy from those whose nature it is to put sympathy before rule. The ideal teacher would combine the two tendencies in perfect equipoise ; we know that in the real teacher a predominant strictness can go with a delightful underlying sympathy, or an attitude that is predominantly sympathetic with a steady, quiet insistence upon ordered method ; but the main generalization holds good that one tendency or the other is usually uppermost. There is no question, apart from personal predilections, of the one being better or worse than the other. The average child's verdict betrays no choice in the matter : he would rather be taught by " a beast, but a just beast " than by a cheerful, easy-going idler ; laxity bores him, though he prefers a method that is lax but alive to an aimless, illogical severity. The method which gives him the sense of getting something done is the method that best pleases him ; and different teachers have

temperamentally different ways of evoking the latent vitality of a class.

The way of Froebel is the way of sympathy ; to be fully effective it demands a certain intuitive meeting of minds between teacher and pupils ; it makes mutual understanding prior to rule. The way of Herbart makes rule prior to understanding, even as the Herbartian psychology makes empirical conceptions prior to will and character. It will be as well briefly to work out this antithesis, since it is fundamental to the two aspects of method with which we are continually faced. They are co-ordinate aspects ; neither can afford to dispense with the other ; we are simply dealing with the fact of common experience that teachers approach methodology from the one side or from the other according to their natural bent of mind. The teacher to whom it comes naturally to start with the child's will or character as it is, and to make this the nucleus and the criterion of the material subjected to the child's mental activity, is a person endowed with an instinctive judgment of character that does not form part of everyone's natural equipment. Such a teacher will study the educational psychology of Herbart with keen interest in that masterly analysis of relations, but with a haunting wonder that Herbart should have elected to work out the sequence of the educational process exactly upside down. A teacher of the other type can make little of Froebel's precept that he should begin by

realizing the child's potentialities for fruitful activity and then adjust both matter and method to this realization, because the realization is precisely that which he finds most difficult to achieve, and the power to achieve it will probably be among the last acquisitions of his later experience. To him it is Froebel who seems to be putting the cart before the horse, and the Herbartian sequence of events appears natural, illuminating, and inevitable. He asks, "What shall I teach, and how?"—and Herbart tells him, instead of instructing him to gaze at that enigmatic creature, the child, and find out.

But then the troublesome critic steps in to assure him that Herbart's view of mind is mechanical and lifeless. The criticism is often accepted as sufficient reason for Herbart's dismissal from the region of educational ideals, but it needs examination. There is nothing wrong with a thought-mechanism if it can be shown to have a right use. If it can also be shown to have a use that is for many people indispensable, its claim to possess vital importance when rightly used is assured. The only danger for the student is of coming to think, as Herbart himself certainly tended to think, that a mechanism is an explanation—that a thought-structure which gives a framework of cognition for the how of things must also automatically account for the why. In Herbart's system, presentation is the primary fundamental. The whole complex of mentality, that blossoms into diverse faculties of mind and different

manifestations of will and character, is solely a complex of inter-reacting presentations. It is right presentation, in co-ordinate arrangement and sequence, that creates faculty, will, and character. Mind is a unity in diversity of developed knowledge-cells, as body is of physical cells. The chicken comes from the egg. So far all is well. The trouble begins when the logical habit of the Herbartian thinker proceeds, as though by a reflex action that he is powerless to control, to round off the syllogism by asserting triumphantly that therefore the egg does not come from the chicken.

It must be admitted that Herbart led the way in breaking the natural circle that unites his educational philosophy with that of Froebel. "In his psychology," says Professor Ward, "Herbart rejects altogether the doctrine of mental faculties as one refuted by his metaphysics, and tries to show that all psychical phenomena whatever result from the action and interaction of elementary ideas or presentations." It is perfectly true that they do so result; the error lies in rejecting the correlative truth that presentations in their turn have depended for the selection and apprehension that is their birth in the mind upon previously developed or inherited faculties. It is purely a question of personal outlook, as we have tried to suggest, which truth should be taken for convenience as prior to the other; the thing that matters is that the teacher, from whichever side of the circle he elects to start, should

eventually work round to the other side and to a realization of the whole.

We have identified the personal view that regards presentation as the primary art of teaching with the tendency to a prevalent strictness in method. Let us italicize a clause in Professor Ward's paraphrase of one of the Herbartian arguments: "If we were without sensations, *i.e. were never bound against our will to endure the persistence of a presentation*, we should never know what being is." This is a fact of life, the strict teacher very truly observes, and if education is training for life it must be made a fact of education. But there is also the very simple educational fact that a presentation which is made to persist entirely against the will of the learner is a wholly ineffective presentation, engendering nothing but distaste for the subject presented and insensibility to its attraction and value. Froebel's way out of this very real dilemma is to enlist the higher will of the learner against the lower, to call in the child's innate desire for originative activity as the natural ally of his better will, and to present each undertaking in such a way that the child's best faculties are put upon their mettle. But we are considering the case of the teacher for whom this method has no natural appeal—who does not possess as an instinct, and has not yet learned to acquire, the power of gauging will and faculty in the child, even if he does not follow Herbart in doubting whether such things have any primary existence.

It is no use asking this teacher to take a mental jump into the void, in the hope of landing somewhere in the neighbourhood of Froebel's conception. He has to proceed step by step round the circle ; and the steps that Herbart marks out are invaluable, once the point is realized at which Herbart, alarmed at his own manifest approach to the idea of creative will, hurriedly cuts across the circle in order to get back to his starting-point with his preconceived theory intact.

The side of the educational circle that represents exact and logical method was perforce left somewhat undefined by Froebel. He handed down a methodology detailed enough but highly empirical, and capable of conscientious use without a trace of inspiration from his guiding principles. For the teacher of the true Froebel type, not the merely "Froebel-trained," an intuitive sympathy continually transcends method, though if sympathy is not to fall into sentimental fallacies the more he defines his method the better, even as the teacher for whom Herbart's systematic scheme is not only advisable but indispensable must also study to develop the factor of intuitive sympathy in his work. For the successive stages on the way to sympathetic understanding Herbart is an excellent guide, up to the point where he takes fright at the spectre of originaive Will. Needless to say, being a genuine educator, he implicitly accepts the primary function of the child's will from the outset ; but he escapes

an explicit admission of the fact by reducing will to its simplest terms and calling it interest. His discussion of interest is of classic importance theoretically, and of the highest practical value, as all teachers know who have submitted themselves to its fascination. Here we have the elaboration of the primary motive for learning, and it is easy to see that this and Froebel's enlistment of the child's impulse to activity are the obverse and the reverse of the same sterling coin. But what of Froebel's nucleus for the co-ordination of activity and knowledge in the freely developing nature of the child? The answer may be put in the form that Herbart's nucleus is in the mind of the teacher, upon whom the responsibility devolves of thinking out the connection and the vital interrelation between all branches of knowledge, and of so presenting these, again, as to engage the keen and active interest of the pupil. Thus Herbart was led to work out a system of correlation which should be a model for every teacher to emulate—not, we may insist, mechanically to adopt. All teaching must be originative if it is to possess a live appeal, even regarded solely as presentation. The word "appeal" brings us back to the child's active, growing receptivity—the truer nucleus, to Froebel's way of thinking. But it matters little whether the vital centre be regarded as having its seat in the mind of the teacher or of the pupil when the mind of teacher and of pupil are at one; and it is to this sympathy that the comprehending follower of

Herbart will come, and by a way of reason which, rightly pursued, leads as surely to education in freedom as the way of intuition.

Indeed, the Herbartian treatment of presentation is in one respect uniquely necessary for training in social liberty. There is one aspect of education for which the nucleus must be in the teacher's mind before it can be transferred to the child's: that in which education appears as the handing down of a progressively self-enriching tradition. Professor Dewey, a fine and a sincere advocate of the Rousseau-Pestalozzi-Froebel school of educational thought, has put forward an admirable but an insufficient definition of education as a process by which children are "to find out how to make knowledge when it is needed." The present writer has ventured the criticism* that knowledge is a thing which has to be preserved, and handed down through the educational system, precisely and most importantly when it is not "needed." Truth is not always popular; and when it is least popular it must be most rigidly conserved. In fact we cannot have a liberal education without its conservative aspect. It is a good thing to do away with false and lifeless traditions; but it is necessary to put true and vital traditions in their place. Without traditions, education slides with every other activity of man into utilitarianism, or enslavement to things.

Our living traditions have to be realized by the

* In *The Westminster Gazette*, Aug. 5th, 1916.

teacher and presented to the child. They cannot be evolved out of the child's inner consciousness. It is essential that children should develop a social sense of their own in schools which are "free republics of childhood," in Froebel's phrase; but this is not the end of the matter. They have to realize the best social traditions of their age and of the ages before; and these have to be presented to them so that their own developing social sense may go out to welcome the presentation; but the presentation itself comes to them from without, interpreted by those who teach them. The student of Froebel learns how to prepare the actively, not passively recipient mind; the student of Herbart learns how to prepare the interpretation.

While we are upon the subject of the Herbartian view of teaching in its relation to tradition it may conveniently be added, as a kind of footnote to this chapter, that bad traditions need to be traced in teaching as well as good, for their example and warning. In studying educational traditions, the teacher learns by observing where and why education went wrong; the ebb as well as the flow of right ideals has to be considered if the outlook is to be complete. So in teaching social traditions, the errors as well as the inspirations of the past need to be presented. To take the gigantic and obvious case, we have all realized the need of teaching, to the best of our powers, what has been the essential evil of Prussianism and how it developed. Herbart's idea of

correlation will not allow us to make our explanation begin and end with Prussia and its misdeeds. The whole principle of selfish dominance has to be traced, wherever we can find it, through its customary rise into a false glory to its inevitable collapse. In this way we may so present the chief lesson of the war that it may be a lesson for the future, when the false ideal of dominance has to be detected in its next new guise—which need not be military. This is a single example of the way in which right presentation of subjects may be made an essential part of education for social liberty.

XI

SUMMARY

THE contrast between the systems of Herbart and of Froebel is typical of an agelong difference of outlook, not only in educational thought but in all thought. It might be very broadly defined as the conflict in the mind of man between everything and everything else. The creator of a logical scheme such as that of Herbart or Locke (for Locke's system, though patchy in detail, was coherent enough in conception) introduces and to the best of his power co-ordinates everything that he can see to be true and significant, and then valiantly and rather pathetically hopes that this thought-mechanism of his creating will prove to be all-inclusive, that its content is indeed the veritable "everything." Meanwhile the thinker of the type of Froebel or Comenius, who is apt in thought, like Tweedledee in action, to hit everything within reach whether he can see it or not, has envisaged a less coherent but a more suggestive system in which are entangled, if seldom permanently captured, some of the elusive spiritual factors that tantalize, inspire, and finally evade the logical interpreter. The invaluable step

that extends and formulates anew the realized "everything" is consolidated only to raise insight to a fresh view-point, from which fresh demands ensue on behalf of the "everything else."

It has been suggested that a union between the systematic and the idealistic aspects of education must be our aim, or at least, since temperaments vary fruitfully in their outlook upon educational truth, a union in difference between naturally divergent views. So of the other differing types of educational outlook upon which we have touched in our earlier chapters. Take the controversy now recrudescing between the advocates of scientific and of literary training. Every now and then there is audible amid the din of disputation a quiet voice suggesting that a synthesis of the two is what we need, such a synthesis as Comenius hoped might compose the strife of humanist and realist three hundred years ago. Greek education had pointed the way long before in a system that united the values of use and beauty, and the neo-Hellenism of the Renaissance had revitalized the Greek ideal and given it continuity in change, a continuity since broken and not yet restored. Science is to-day an activity of far wider and more complex significance than ever it has been before, demanding more than ever the unification with the other activities of man that Bacon desired for it. The educator who doubts the possibility of finding a place for science, thoroughly studied, in co-ordination with the classical

scheme surely needs to enquire into and to effect a revaluation of the synthetic curriculum of Comenius or Herbart. Revaluation is essential ; no system comes down from the past ready-made to our hand ; but the principle comes down, changed only in that it is intensified, that the " place " of the scientific outlook in the educational scheme is everywhere, throughout the whole. Like all the major attitudes of the mind, the scientific attitude either pervades and helps the rest or it remains in dangerous isolation.

Not unconnected with this antithesis between science and the humanities, in common discussion if not in reality, is the opposition between facts and ideas as units of the educative process, with the correlative opposition (since *faciendo facta patent*) between doing and thinking. Probably there has never been a time when a smaller proportion of people in the civilized world took joy and pride in the work of their hands than at present. Machinery, replacing the craftsman, has extruded the craftsman's training and outlook ; and the vital energies that machinery has set free have not been turned to higher expression in the arts. It may be believed that the consequences extend over the entire field of human development, from the physical region in which lack of co-ordination between mind and muscle has an adverse effect upon both bodily and mental poise, to the region of character in which the relation between right thinking and right doing is

deprived of a valuable elementary stimulus towards integration. Froebel's recognition of the issues involved was far-reaching enough to have been widely neglected ; and though the educative integration of thought, feeling, and action demands still further study and research we must wait for the penetration of Froebel's principle of activity into our schools before present-day civilization can catch even a glimpse of the secret that a medieval workman learned unconsciously in his apprenticeship.

This notion of spontaneous, originaive activity, whether we see it in the craftsmanship-ideal that produced the glories of Gothic architecture or in the somewhat crude methodology that gave to it, in infantile form, its first consciously articulate expression in the original kindergarten of Froebel, is inevitably connected with a notion of freedom, but of a freedom that can be called free only in terms of its harmony with social control. It is true that this social liberty can only come about through the organic self-reconstruction of our social order ; but it is an extension of the same truth to add that self-reconstruction can only be effected by a society whose units are aware of the liberty in union which is called fellowship. This realization can be made a living fact in our schools ; and to that end the question can be made a touchstone for every educational project down to the least detail of method : Does this actively and practically conduce to fellowship in work ? If the question were seriously

asked and answered of our methods as they are we should find that many of them needed recasting. We might do worse than begin with the unlovely process by which a main incentive towards love of knowledge in the young is made to consist in their bidding against each other for marks.

Great realizations of principle are built up by co-ordinating small units of practice, and the test question is a simple and a useful bit of mind-machinery for bringing practice under the scrutiny of ideals. It is also an observed fact that those test questions are the most used and the most useful which the questioner has thought out and formulated for himself. Those which have been adopted from another mind lack the vitality that comes of personal revaluation, and if we suggest a few more it is in the hope that others will improve upon them, rather than with the idea of providing a *vade mecum* in catechetical form. Every mind has its own way of analysing and recombining ideas, a way that is in some small sense unique and irreplaceable ; this truth is indeed a major argument on behalf of education through free development, no less than for freedom to think and plan on the teacher's part. Let us take the idea of freedom in fellowship into the further region of national and international fellowship, with which our minds are so deeply exercised at this time. Again a test question can be applied. Are we teaching what a nation is, in the side of our work that treats of history and of civics ? Are we eliciting any

ideal of the mother-state, such as the Roman child knew ? The story of our share in the war proves how true but how untaught a spirit was ready to be evoked ; and the tasks of peace will require the teaching of a very much better prepared lesson. And while we consider Roman motherhood and the Latin home as the unit-realization in the Roman's love of country we may ask how far our teaching is connected, as Pestalozzi's was connected, with the actual interests of home and locality that are the natural units of the civic sense and of an understanding patriotism. To teach the patriotism that combines strength in national self-maintenance with the principle of live and let live which is the reduction to its simplest terms of the international ideal, we have to ask how far we have remastered the lesson which the unsurpassed prophets of Israel taught, and did not even in that perpetually warring age teach wholly in vain.

It is often said that when the present war between national ideals of dominance and of liberty is over, we shall be faced with another war, less sanguinary but no less stern and unrelenting, between class-ideals. Workers resent the domination of industry by the power of capital ; masters fear the domination of industry by the power of organized labour ; and a hold upon industry, in this industrial age, means to a great extent a hold upon politics. Whether we can only learn industrial sense through the tragedy of a class war, waged with the weapons

of starvation and of waste, or whether the present complete upsetting of old compromises will be discounted by the new fellowship that men learn when they unite for a common purpose, is a question to be left to those who care to prophesy. The business of education is to promote the cause of honourable peace with liberty, no less between classes than between nations.

In so far as a root difference of outlook between a master-class and a worker-class is due to education we can say that the master-class is in the oligarchic tradition of Milton and of Locke, imperfectly realized even in its imperfection, but of long standing, handed down for many generations in our public school system ; while the workers are in a very much vaguer egalitarian tradition, the dangerously vague egalitarianism of Rousseau, recently made saner and safer by some slight addition of democratic education after the Pestalozzi-Froebel example. There is not only a diversity but a division between the one outlook and the other ; all industrial history shows the root cause of every struggle to have been a failure to understand. What has educational history to suggest for a further and a fuller effort to promote understanding ?

We have seen the Miltonic education of a superior caste in the light of the universalism of Comenius, which was a universalism of class as well as of subject-matter. Our segregation of the classes in youth obviously has its disadvantages, whatever the

benefit to the more cultured class, and there is hope, if only a slowly developing hope, in our gradual opening of the doors of culture to the elect by merit as well as to the elect by wealth. Meanwhile the Comenian universalism of mind, coupled with Froebel's doctrine of activity, might show two very salutary results in our young elect: not only increased understanding of labour problems and of the largely inarticulate labour ideal, but a tendency to that keen, active helpfulness which would make every young aristocrat or plutocrat a worker by choice and preference. Our problem will be immensely simplified as we succeed in eliminating from it the contest between worker and non-worker for the good things of life. Indeed, the existence in it of this element may be the problem's main difficulty. With no one to consider in the State but workers of different grades, understanding each other's functions and their dependence upon one another, the apportionment of opportunity and reward, if still a matter of conflicting claims, could be worked out upon clear principles of practical justice.

Meanwhile the Labour ideal has not to be suppressed—ideals, suppressed, run underground and breed strange and violent shapes in the darkness—but to be made more intelligent. Labour knows life from an angle of experience denied to the master-class, and we have put the principle into effect in our State that the criticism of Labour should be expressed and welcomed; but neither the expression

nor the welcome has come up to our more sanguine hopes. The knowledge which is the basis of constructive criticism is lacking; and destructive criticism, however one-sidedly reasonable, is seldom welcomed by that which it seeks to destroy. Our elementary and State-secondary schools are only very tentatively beginning to revalue the ideal of Pestalozzi and to train that understanding of conditions and their causes which would enable those who lack liberty to make their appeal articulate, united, and irresistible.

The curriculum of any and every school must surely be subjected to the test-question, How far does this scheme conduce towards knowledge of social conditions? Failure to promote this knowledge is not only a mistake but a disgrace; and our own failure would be an inexplicable disgrace if it were not that we fear political bias on the part of teachers, and for this reason keep the entire practical basis of politics out of sight of education. But we can see a way out of the dilemma between no politics and partisan politics in the teaching that consciously aims at the promotion of mutual understanding. For the teacher, the test-question might be whether his interpretation of the facts of our social life tends to unite or to divide opinion. If the teacher, holding strong social and political views, objects that it is not in him to cry peace when he feels that there is no peace, he may be reminded that neither is it his business to preach social war in the classroom,

as is so often done by underground implication under our present plan of having no open teaching of sociology at all. In any case the unavoidable minimum of bias can do less harm when it colours the teaching of facts than when it prompts the unconscious communication of prejudices.

The reader is perhaps returning to the thought of an unmanageably plethoric curriculum. As this page is written the news comes that one of our greater public schools has decided to introduce the teaching of natural science throughout its classical side ; and the practical parent to whom notice has been sent of the decision has promptly expressed his misgiving lest this extension of range may weaken the thoroughness of the school's work. If a place has to be found for social science as well, can thoroughness possibly be retained ? The only answer is in the categorical imperative : it must be retained ; and not only retained, but increased. We have seen that the problem is perennial ; it has had to be solved at every stage of educational history and it has to be solved again now. The means of solution are the same now as they have always been : a careful cutting-out of dead wood (such as the memorizing, forgetting, and remembering of Greek inflections and syntax, or of mathematical methods, by children still too young to master them thoroughly) ; a breaking-down of partitions between cognate subjects (such as history and geography, geography and science, science and mathematics),

so as to save wasteful and lifeless work due to overlapping (such as the endless working out of imaginary mathematical problems while science and geography present endless problems that are real and practically interesting) ; and a positive linking-up of subjects so that they may pull together in the mind instead of aimlessly jostling one another.*

Even this, we have to remember, is only the "everything" of education ; there still remains the "everything else." Our teaching has not only to be so ordered that the mind can accommodate the necessary knowledge of to-day, but also so inspired that the mind may reach out through knowledge of facts to its further goal. It is comforting to reflect that those of the great educators, or of the educated peoples of the past, who took the widest range of knowledge for the province of education, also reached out towards the highest ideals of human life and conduct. There seems to be little fear that extensive knowledge, if it is not of the dull encyclopædic order, may crowd out the higher faculties of spirit ; rather, it enriches and supports them. To unify knowledge is to create ideals.

There is one test-question which we continually apply to any ideal, with so unremitting and one-sided an emphasis, indeed, that its use tends somewhat to become an unmeaning reflex action of the

* It ought to be added, perhaps, that this is a conclusion drawn not only from a personal interpretation of educational history, but also from the experience of twelve years' practical school work.

mind : the question, Is it practical ? If we as consistently asked of our practice, Is it ideal ? the answer would always be that of course it is not ; but the asking of the question would be a stimulus towards more consistent effort to make our practice as nearly ideal as our limitations allow. And the idealist, in education as in anything else, has as good a right to answer that of course his ideal is not practical ; it would not be an ideal if it were. It has to be made practical ; but it would be of no use as an ideal unless it were ahead of practice. The question, "Can it be made practical ? " would be a more useful, a more sensible, and in fact a more practical inquiry. And the attitude of mind which this form of the question would imply, an attitude of open-minded readiness, of the practical mind with its faculties marshalled and ordered, seeking new worlds to conquer, comes chiefly of a wide unity of knowledge. It was the attitude of Comenius, who, preceded by unpractical dreamers, took up their dreams and wove them into noonday fact.

Further, in co-ordinating the practical with the ideal, that which we can see to be advisable with that which we can feel to be right, we have another elementary test-question to apply, a question which the practical worker and the idealist are apt to bandy with one another, each in the comfortable conviction that he is propounding a poser : the question, Is it true ? Practice, considered as apart from its ideal, is a matter of expediency only ; idealism,

considered as apart from its practical expression, is a matter of feeling only—a purely æsthetic function of the mind. With the union of the two we gain a synthesis of immeasurable value, but it is a value of which Truth still has her question to ask. Practical idealism can still err from verity in acting upon a vision of what cannot be, and in working from the world not as it is but as it seems. Hellas, predominantly ideal, and Rome, predominantly practical, both fell ; Germany, once the home of a fine philosophic idealism and till lately the very culmination of the practical, has fallen into as terrible a truth-blindness as ever punished a nation's sins. Education, of all the works of man, is the most bound and the most free to keep an unclouded eye upon truth ; the most bound because of its responsibility for the future, and the most free because the uncramped mind of youth offers so open and unlimited a field for the recognition of reality. Reality, temporal and spiritual, and the veridical foresight that comes from knowledge of reality, is a part, not the entire sum, of educational principle ; but is it not the part that is most neglected among the great educational values ? This is a question of sufficient importance to demand a concluding chapter.

XII

CONCLUSION—EDUCATION AND REALITY

I N *The Ultimate Belief*, a book that should have a wide influence upon educational principle and method, Mr. Clutton-Brock has challenged this nation as having neglected to teach a philosophy. Germany developed and taught a bad national philosophy, the philosophy of the selfish State, for half a century, and it was not until Germany had put this philosophy into practice that we began to open our eyes to the fact. If we had possessed a philosophy, instead of despising the very idea of such a possession, we might have known a bad philosophy when we saw one—and known by experience that real philosophies, good and bad alike, have issue not only in fine-spun theoretical systems but in acts. We can see the issue of the Greek philosophy of beauty in Greek sculpture and the Greek polity ; we can see the issue of the earlier Roman philosophy of practical morals in the Roman filial devotion and the Roman law ; we can see the issue of the German philosophy of Germanness written clear in Flanders and France, in Serbia and Poland.

What is our own implicit scale of values, if the accusation be true that of explicit philosophy we have none ?

Of the human spirit's three ultimate, disinterested functions, in Mr. Clutton-Brock's system—the idealistic or beauty-seeking, the practically moralistic or rule-seeking, and the realistic or truth-seeking—we have suggested that the third suffers the most neglect in education. It has begun to recover its place in contemporary thought ; the novel, our civilization's characteristic and accepted art-form, has lately found for realism even of the flattest and most unqualified sort a surprising popular welcome ; there is a genuine sense afoot that we are not good at seeing things as they really are, with its corollary of a desire to see more truly. Unconscious humbug, which is lack of realistic vision, our friendliest critics still declare in courteous periphrases to be our national weakness. Our implicit philosophy has been a preference for feeling rather than seeing our way. Undoubtedly there is something in the conviction which is growing amongst us that this is not the whole of wisdom for an organism endowed with eyes.

If the vital importance of reality in education thus becomes our concluding theme it is not from any desire to set Truth above idealism or practical morality. Each depends at every step upon the other's progress for its own. But education has to take account of the observed fact, now creeping into

recognition, that our ideals and our practice alike are hampered in their advance by lack of touch with the real. To demonstrate the fact on the spot we have only to observe that the preceding sentence would be read at first sight by many people in a sense that would make "the real" synonymous with "the concrete" or even "the material," so crude is as yet our prevalent conception of the reality that we have begun to seek. It is also very common for the thought of reality to be connected with nothing but the actualities of the present moment. But it is a false realism that sees that which now is in terms of itself alone, without sense of historical perspective. One of the school subjects that stand most in need of broad-mindedly realist treatment is history, usually presented in so exclusively romantic and moralist a setting. History teems with romance and with morals; but the romance is a matter of pasteboard and limelight, and the moralizing stirs nothing higher in the learner than the reflex impulse to yawn, unless the history is made real—as it is made, for example, in the volumes on *The People of England* by Mr. Stanley Leathes. A sense of historical reality is vital to the development of that understanding foresight which Comenius saw to be one of the foundations of the world's peace.

We have dwelt upon the close touch with realities of the home and of the local environment whereby Pestalozzi's unsystematic system gained so incal-

culably in value. The rise and increase in America of schools that have made this co-ordination a guiding principle, described in Professor and Miss Dewey's book *Schools of To-morrow*, furnishes both an object-lesson and a warning. The methods of these schools are worth detailed study as revaluations of an essential principle, but the contact with reality is too much bounded by the present and the concrete, by a circle too narrowly drawn about a centre of material reward, even though the reward be social rather than individual and to that important extent the more spiritualized. Our treatment of reality has to be ultimately rooted in the pure, disinterested desire for truth that takes other rewards than truth itself as mere incidentals. It is nevertheless a fact, as every great educator of the past has shown, even an enthusiast as nebulous about method as Rousseau, that the way to pure truth lies through the concrete. The danger lies in wandering so aimlessly into the concrete region as never to wander out again. It is neither in this way that reality is found nor in the way that sets stark, abstract "truths" before the young as though they would be comprehended, unverified, by some sudden leap of the youthful mind into the experience of maturity. By the first of these ways a child's appetite for reality, naturally insatiable, is dulled by a diet at once monotonous and rubbishy; by the second the young mind is offered its food in a locked box, without the key, and, unless it is of the

“irrepressible genius ” type that insists upon breaking locks, soon comes neither to know nor care whether there is food within or not.

But what is the essence of this reality that education has to teach ? The inquiry brings us uncomfortably near to the question, What is Truth ?—for which we have no recorded answer, nor prospect of finding a complete answer on this side of eternity. Retreating from the enigma of all philosophies, let us take a humbler standpoint of inquiry and put the question from a different angle. How does reality grow ? In what manner does it come into being ? This, after all, is the educator’s problem. If our study of educational principles teaches us anything at all it is that reality is the integration of given units of fact ; not the facts themselves, but the ascertained relations in which they stand to one another, the complex of actual, co-ordinated influences, observed and thought together, whereby facts exist in and through one another. To take a simple instance from nature study, a flower’s existence is a fact, and a bee’s existence is a fact ; both facts become more real in the light of two co-ordinating facts—the bee’s dependence upon the flower for food, and the flower’s dependence upon the bee for the reproduction of its kind. Similarly, every co-ordination of fact with fact is an access of reality ; our original concepts of “ flower ” and “ bee ” become more real in proportion as they are connected with more facts about flowers and bees and about

everything related to them ; but in every case it is the new relation, not the new fact, that is the increment of reality. The new fact alone, if it could be conceived as entirely alone, would add nothing. But in much instruction the most painstaking efforts are made to present facts as separate, isolated conceptions. This is precisely the method by which to make teaching unreal.

The antithesis of this method is that which we have described as the synthetic method. Only the name, and very probably not even that, is new. It is a method that in the hands of Comenius or Pestalozzi, of Froebel or Herbart, diversely interpreted, has given a uniform result. The result has been knowledge of reality, attained by following the single principle that relations, though they depend on facts, are more important than facts. "Take a bone from a dog ; what remains ? " asks the Red Queen. It is the dog's temper that remains—a reality of greater import to the taker of the bone than anything else in the situation. Take Belgium from the Belgians ; what remains ? Not only the magnificent temper of those who stayed the German vanguard at Liège, but a reality of world-wide indignation that Prussia, once the suppressor of Froebel's education in freedom, had been powerless to foresee. It is the reality, the soul of the facts, that matters ; and all reality is built up, within the mind as without it, from small beginnings in the gradual growing together of relations. That the educator

must view relations widely as well as correlate them closely is a principle which the diverse experience of the past, in success or failure, sufficiently shows forth ; the development of the widest synthesis of relations is the evolution of the richest and the most trustworthy reality.

It is a truism to say that the sins and the horrors of our civilization are chiefly due, not to a prevailing fondness for what is wrong and horrible, but to a prevailing lack of realization. Everyone knows, for instance, that slum-life ought not to be ; everyone feels that it is hideous ; very few people fully realize that it is one of the lies of civilization, a fact which convicts our morals and our good taste of a fundamental insincerity. Our ways of thought are too moral and too tasteful not to shrink from the truth about the slums and about civilized peoples who allow slums to exist. But this is not to say that we have too much morality or good taste. We have too little ; because we have still less love of the truth for its own sake. Let us pursue this instance further by inquiring why the slums have not been to us all, as the war is, a haunting horror, continually at the back of the mind, that cries shame upon our civilization even while it calls for glories of devotion and of sacrifice to qualify the shame.

We have been taught to see our social life, and the life of man in general, as an agglomeration of facts ; we have been compelled to see the war as a complex of relations. The war strikes at our personal

interests from one unexpected quarter after another; it wakes us up to our intricate dependence upon each other as our peace-time education never began to wake us up. Every relation, important to a people in arms, between man and man, between one activity and another, has had to be hurriedly, urgently, imperfectly drummed into our intelligence as a matter of immediate, vital necessity. Peace taught us facts, unrelated; war has compelled us to go back and recognize some of the more elementary relations that constitute reality. Perhaps war will always be necessary so long as we allow facts to lie to us, and even welcome every comforting lie that saves us from the pains of thought.

Slum-life, our particular instance, is a fact; seen in its relation to other facts it proves itself more destructive of human values than any war. What proportion of our war expenditure in money, energy, and thought would have abolished it? There seems no reason why it should not have been done away with, except that it was not a reality to us.

Why was it not a reality, while war is a reality? Evolution has its reply that courage is older than either compassion or social wisdom, and that the call to valour is a call to the more primitive complex of instincts. We can always be roused to face an issue, great or small, when there is to be a fight about it. Education has not yet made good its rejoinder that the arts of peace need courage, and even a certain fine pugnacity, no less than the art

of war. The valour of Lord French, between Mons and the Marne, is equalled by the valour of his sister, Mrs. Despard, in the East End of London. But we do little in our teaching to voice the call of social facts for this pacific valour. Both courage and compassion are ready to be called in aid of a truer civilization, but the call is too seldom made to ring clear. It is less a call than a conflicting medley of half-muffled cries.

We teach facts, though not widely enough ; and we teach many and diverse ideas about the facts, but without the unity that comes of tracing their relation to one another. Facts are bound to one another in an orderly network of relations ; and unrelated ideas are loose ends which we have failed to join up, leaving gaps in the network. If we leave enough of these loose ends hanging, our network becomes a mere tangle. In this tangle the best that we can do is painfully to unravel one thread at a time ; and it is characteristic of the ill-educated mind to be able to hold only one idea at a time. To take a simple instance from the war, we found ourselves able to think of men, or of munitions, or of money ; it took a year to persuade us that it was imperatively necessary to think of all three, and to think of them in relation to one another.

Our final suggestion is, then, that synthetic method, or the orderly building together of relations, is the way of reality ; and that reality is the goal which we have chiefly failed to seek. If any reader

would set against this view the great text, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness," the reply of all true education through the ages is that the kingdom of truth is the place where righteousness dwells, and that the Unseen will remain unseen by those who search in an unreal world. It is the real world that education has to help towards becoming an ideal world ; and it is in our relations to the real world that we have to develop and express our idea of goodness. In so far as our conception of reality is in a tangle we are the less able either to form good ideals or to be good.

The unclouded reality of which we are in search is spiritual ; but it is much easier to talk of spiritual reality than to say what we mean by it. We cannot say what Truth is, ultimately, unless indeed we call it the union of all the relations that there are between all the facts of the universe—which is only another way of declaring our ignorance. But it is a definition of the nature of our ignorance which perhaps points the way to knowledge ; and in the works of the greatest educators we see combined a positively cosmic conception of knowledge and an infinite patience in teaching small hands to weave together the threads of the gigantic fabric.

Such realism is not that which was once opposed—though artificially opposed, as we have seen—to the predominantly æsthetico-moral system then known as humanism ; it has no quarrel with anyone but the most lifeless of formalists ; but in case the

neo-humanists have a bone to pick with our insistence upon reality let us hasten to make the *amende honorable* before the contest is engaged. We have been considering under the guise of reality, or of truth, that which is also beauty at its loveliest and morality at its loftiest. Beauty is the exquisite harmony of relations ; so is truth. Goodness is the splendid spirit that seeks in the union of relations the freedom of the soul ; so is truth. The three are one. Still, of the three, it seems to be chiefly truth that has been starved and left, famishing, to lag behind ; and for this reason truth, or the reality that is the food and the substance of truth, has been made the dominant note of this concluding study in educational values. Those who would prefer the co-ordinate, not countervailing claims of character and feeling are more than welcome to amend any thoughts of educational reconstruction that these cursory chapters may have suggested.

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